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 The institutions that comprise the United States intelligence community have 
organizational cultures that are unique from other government agencies.  These cultures 
encourage the development and retention of traits that are necessary to mission 
accomplishment, yet these exclusivities also hamstring organizations and contribute to 
significant security failures. This thesis isolates elements of organizational culture 
specific to the United States intelligence community and explores the extent to which 
the culture is responsible for security and/or counterintelligence shortcomings. 
 For this thesis, the author selected three governmental organizations with 
intelligence collection and analysis functions:  Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).  The use 
of these agencies demonstrates that the intelligence community’s military (ONI), 
intelligence (CIA), and law enforcement (FBI) components share common 
organizational traits. 
The author subsequently identified a significant security failure case 
encountered by each agency and employed a case study approach to determine the 
extent to which organizational culture contributed to the security failures. Internal 
agency investigations and external assessments of espionage activities reveal that 
cultural factors impede the early detection of security compromises and thwart law 
enforcement efforts to investigate suspicious behavior. 
 Despite the deleterious effects of national security collapses, the intelligence 
community’s personnel increasingly recognize the complicity of organizational culture 




negative aspects of its organizational traits, and there have been substantive strides 
within the intelligence establishment to minimize the security obstacles that 
organizational culture imposes on its constituent adherents.   
 The intelligence apparatus must maintain an organizational culture that 
distinguishes it from other government agencies.  Unfortunately, the community’s 
cultural characteristics also convey increased risks of security compromises.  It is 
possible, however, for the United States intelligence community to maintain its unique 






Organizations tasked with the collection and analysis of intelligence share 
cultural characteristics that distinguish them from most private sector groups and other 
governmental agencies that do not deal with intelligence matters regularly.  Although 
certain cultural characteristics are as much a part of foreign (non-United States) 
intelligence agencies as they are central to the United States intelligence community, 
this thesis will concentrate on cultural concepts and the role they play in select United 
States intelligence agencies.   
The organizational culture of the United States intelligence community allows 
the establishment to achieve operational objectives, but the same culture also 
contributes to security failures that continually plague the United States intelligence 
apparatus.  Among the organizational culture characteristics that are specific to the 
intelligence community is the assumption that intelligence organizations will attract and 
employ individuals whose personalities, ideologies, and motivations are dissimilar from 
those of other government and private sector employees.  Diverse value systems are 
also critical to the intelligence function, yet the necessity of divergent value systems 
poses significant risks to the security of intelligence functions.  The intelligence 
community also stresses concepts such as limited information disclosure, extensive 
compartmentation policies, and routine counterintelligence protocols that border on 
paranoia.  Other cultural attributes of the intelligence community include the degree of 
pre- and post-employment screening and security measures to which intelligence 
employees are subject.  There are also numerous personal, public, and institutional 
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factors that contribute to and complicate the intelligence community’s unique 
organizational culture.  
It is extremely important for intelligence professionals to be aware of those 
cultural traits that are specific to the intelligence community because it is possible for 
individuals to act in accordance with those organizational culture principles while 
minimizing the possibility of security lapses due to exaggerations, abuses, and neglect 
of the intelligence culture’s attributes.  This awareness is exceptionally vital to 
intelligence managers and counterintelligence professionals who must proactively 
balance cultural necessities with the security weaknesses that organizational culture 
may exacerbate. 
In its simplest form, organizational culture refers to the norms, values, and 
expectations that influence and govern the manner in which groups (or agencies) 
prioritize objectives and conduct their affairs.  Culture also establishes acceptability 
parameters for behavior within a given body and details the consequences or results of 
nonconformance with underlying assumptions.  Organizational culture is basically a 
theoretical explanation for the means by which an organization accomplishes its 
objectives (Schein 7).  Contrary to common beliefs, intelligence refers to more than 
mere information.  Information develops into intelligence when contextual analysis by 
persons or equipment capable of interpreting its relation to other information determines 
that it is of substantive value.  Information becomes intelligence when the organizations 
that employ it in the decision-making process attach worth to it.  Mark Lowenthal 
accurately notes that “[a]ll intelligence is information; not all information is 
intelligence” (Lowenthal 2). 
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In practically every organization, there exist belief systems, expectations, 
understandings, and concepts that affect the efficiency of the organization as well as the 
means by which groups and the individuals that comprise them attempt to accomplish 
given goals and priorities.  Within organizations, there are also value systems at play 
that allow (and occasionally compel) employees to evaluate group dynamics and 
determine whether individual values and belief systems are compatible with or contrary 
to those exhibited by the organization or groups that comprise it.  The combination of 
individual and community value systems with supervisory guidance/directive helps to 
define a system of norms and expectations specific to a given organization.  The culture 
of the organization affects all aspects of its operation, including productivity, efficiency, 
and employee morale.  Within those agencies that comprise the United States 
intelligence community (IC), however, organizational culture factors are more complex 
than in many organizations and impact far more than profitability. 
The agencies, departments, and bureaus that comprise the United States 
intelligence community differ greatly from other governmental organizations due to 
their unique missions, methodologies, and organizational cultures.  The organizational 
personalities that evolve in intelligence establishment entities are unavoidably necessary 
to the organizations’ abilities to accomplish assigned objectives.  However, the very 
characteristics that contribute to the intelligence community’s unique organizational 
culture may also impede its ability to protect itself from security compromises and those 
who threaten operational security by disclosing classified information for ideological, 
monetary, or other reasons. 
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 Given the nature of intelligence operations as well as the collection and 
analytical activities associated with such functions, it is not surprising that the risks 
affiliated with intelligence actions occasionally result in operational failures, security 
breaches, or counterintelligence shortcomings. Many intelligence functions face 
increased risks of operational compromise because of the intelligence community’s 
reliance on sources and methodology that are susceptible to detection by its subjects’ 
counterintelligence measures.  In addition, many intelligence organizations encounter 
operational constraints that, although imposed by the agency sponsoring the collection 
and analytical activities, hamstring the organizations and ultimately prevent the 
intelligence agencies from detecting security breaches and identifying 
counterintelligence threats.  In fact, the intelligence institution itself may be its own 
worst enemy in terms of security concerns by virtue of the operational attributes it 
embodies and the organizational culture it fosters among its members. 
 The purpose and mission of the United States intelligence community 
necessitate recruitment of employees whose belief and value systems vary widely.  A 
diverse workforce combats homogenous assumptions and expectations that may result 
when groups lack diversity of values and beliefs.  The extent to which employee value 
systems are consistent with or opposed to cultural expectations in intelligence 
organizations impacts mission accomplishment, employee morale, operational security, 
and counterintelligence efforts to detect security risks.  The Pollard and Ames 
espionage cases confirm that poor employee morale may result in disenfranchisement 
with an agency’s intelligence purpose and lead to operational security and 
counterintelligence shortcomings based on inaccurate predictions of employee behavior.    
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Furthermore, due to their responsibilities and the sometimes secretive manner in which 
they perform many assigned objectives, intelligence organizations have developed an 
organizational culture that requires and encourages secrecy, limited information 
sharing, and deep-seated suspicions of other agencies within the intelligence 
community.  Naturally, intelligence professionals are even more suspicious of their 
peers who represent other states’ intelligence and national security interests. 
 Military, intelligence, and law enforcement agencies of the United States that 
collect intelligence clandestinely and analyze classified as well as open-source 
information are the regular targets of other actors’ intelligence establishments.  
Intelligence officers, analysts, and agents routinely engage in high-stakes cat-and-
mouse analyses that draw on game theory principles.  Intelligence professionals 
regularly analyze their collection actions and intelligence analyses in the context of 
“what-if” scenarios that allow them to consider as many possible consequences of their 
efforts and assessments.  The extent to which their operations are successful depends on 
the agencies’ insistence that employees adhere to cultural traits specific to the 
intelligence community.  Naturally, operational success also hinges on opposing 
counterintelligence corps’ detection techniques and the conduct of their own 
intelligence assets.  However, even the most capable professionals and exemplary 
operations the United States has to offer are subject to increased failure risks due to 
internal security breaches and failed counterintelligence operations.  The intelligence 
community’s unique organizational culture contributes directly to its ability to sustain 
operational success and detect threats that could jeopardize intelligence operations. 
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 One of the best-known icons of the United States intelligence community is the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and its headquarters facility located just outside 
Washington, D.C., in Langley, Virginia.    The CIA’s high profile may lead those who 
are unfamiliar with the intelligence community to assume that all intelligence 
operations involve the Agency’s clandestine collection officers.  In actuality, the 
intelligence community consists of at least thirteen agencies within the military, civilian 
intelligence, and law enforcement apparatuses. 
 Each of the Defense Department’s military branches includes occupational 
specialties that are categorized broadly as “military intelligence.”  The United States 
Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps employ civilians and armed service 
members whose duties include intelligence, counterintelligence, and physical and 
technical security functions.  The force strengths within each branch vary internally, but 
comparatively, the intelligence assets of the Army and Navy exceed the resources 
allocated to the Air Force and Marine Corps (“Agencies”).  The armed forces 
intelligence components differ markedly from their civilian and law enforcement 
counterparts.   
The military intelligence corps focuses, appropriately, on force protection issues, 
specifically the collection and analysis of intelligence that impacts or threatens the 
armed force operations of the United States and, increasingly, its allies.  Military 
intelligence resources also respond to tasking from civilian intelligence agencies for 
specific collection requirements and perform extensive foreign language translation and 
interpretation duties of communications and signals intelligence collected by the 
National Security Agency.  The branches also are responsible for other security 
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functions such as initial and periodic background investigations of service members 
whose positions necessitate access to classified information.  To demonstrate that the 
cultural characteristics exhibited by civilian intelligence agencies are also commonplace 
in the military intelligence establishment, this study will include a review of the 
espionage activities of Jonathan Jay Pollard during his employment with the United 
States Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) and the ONI’s inability to identify the threat 
Pollard posed.  The case study demonstrates that cultural traits expected of the CIA are 
inherent in other intelligence institutions as well, including the defense components. 
 As indicated by its title, the Central Intelligence Agency is by far the most 
renowned intelligence agency in the United States intelligence community; 
“intelligence” is in fact generally a synonym of the CIA acronym (Lowenthal 67).   The 
National Security Act of 1947 created the CIA’s predecessor, the Office of Strategic 
Services  (NARA “Records”).  The United States Congress enacted the 1947 legislation 
for two reasons.  The public and its elected representatives sought to prevent another 
national security disaster such as the Pearl Harbor tragedy of December 7, 1941.  
According to many post-attack assessments, the United States could have prevented the 
Japanese attack on Hawaii if better information-sharing practices had occurred between 
military leaders and civilian intelligence professionals (Hitz 2).  The National Security 
Act therefore sought to establish an information clearinghouse for national intelligence 
assembly and analysis with the expectation that improved communications and 
information sharing would diminish if not eliminate security failures due to inadequate 
communication channels (Hitz 2-3). 
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 The OSS was the subject of severe criticism during its organizational infancy 
based on the agency’s role in the Phoenix program during the Vietnam conflict.   The 
Phoenix program was the OSS’s controversial attempt to disrupt programmatically the 
rural apparatus that supported the Vietcong’s need for soldiers and logistics by 
neutralizing Vietcong supporters and their bases in Vietnam and Cambodia (Karnow 
616).  The OSS eventually developed into the Central Intelligence Agency, and the 
current organizational structure divides the agency’s functions among four directorates.   
The Directorate of Administration and Training manages personnel matters to 
include employee hiring, training, transfers, payroll processing, and benefits 
administration.  The Directorate of Science and Technology is responsible for technical 
analysis of photographic, satellite, and other imagery provided by agencies such as the 
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO).  The Directorate of Operations (DO), or the 
clandestine service, is the arm of the CIA tasked with the overseas collection of 
political, military, economic, social, and other information relevant to the development 
and implementation of the United States’s domestic and international policy agendas.  
The DO collects for analysis information that would not be available through overt 
channels.  The Agency’s Directorate of Intelligence (DI) performs all-source analysis of 
classified and unclassified information obtained by the DO and other intelligence 
agencies.  The DI’s analyses also influence domestic and foreign policy decisions made 
by members of the executive and legislative branches of government. 
Each CIA directorate has its own agenda, and each division also has its own 
cultural traits.  Throughout this thesis, reference to the CIA’s organizational culture(s) 
will refer to the Directorate of Operations and Directorate of Intelligence because these 
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directorates best exemplify the cultural characteristics that contribute to security failures 
within the United States intelligence community.  Analysis reveals organizational 
culture factors influence significantly the CIA’s ability to detect and address security 
threats.  The case study of the Aldrich Hazen Ames espionage affair demonstrates this 
fact dramatically.  The review also highlights the stark divide between intelligence 
agencies and law enforcement agencies over the role of intelligence and the 
consequences of that philosophical difference on agencies’ proactive security measures. 
 Unlike intelligence organizations, law enforcement agencies exist to investigate 
and enforce violations of various criminal statutes.  To accomplish this mission, most 
law enforcement agencies receive investigative support from intelligence research 
specialists (or analysts) within intelligence divisions, departments, or groups.  Whereas 
the CIA bears the responsibility for overseas collection requirements and may not 
collect information domestically, law enforcement agencies and the intelligence arms 
that support them must focus primarily on domestic concerns.  Nonetheless, the 
investigative reality is that many law enforcement agencies, particularly the United 
States Customs Service (USCS), Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), have the authority and need to pursue international leads 
in connection with complex criminal investigations.  These agencies’ exposure to 
international actors necessitates high levels of support from internal intelligence assets 
and formal liaisons with external resources to conduct thorough investigations.  The 
case study of the espionage activities of FBI special agent Robert Philip Hanssen 
demonstrates that differences in intelligence and law enforcement ideology are 
surmountable.  The study also indicates that when they are faced with security concerns, 
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law enforcement and intelligence agencies may be mutually dependent on each other to 
determine the source(s) of security failures and prevent unauthorized information 
disclosure or compromise.   
 The case studies of Pollard, Ames, and Hanssen capture dramatically the 
consequences of agencies’ failures to detect or otherwise prevent security compromises 
that ended lives and jeopardized operations.  The following chapters discuss the extent 




REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
 Organizational culture is more than a label or construct used to explain group 
behavior.  In fact, culture is a phenomenon that occurs when a combination of 
characteristics assembles and creates a guidance system that influences both individual 
and group behaviors.  This thesis will employ the description of organizational culture 
provided by Edgar H. Schein, who, in Organizational Culture and Leadership, defines 
culture as  
a pattern of basic assumptions—invented, discovered, or developed by a 
given group as it learns to cope with its problem of external adaptation 
and internal integration—that has worked well enough to be considered 
valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to 
perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems.  (9) 
 
Of particular relevance to the intelligence community is the reference in Schein’s 
definition to external and internal difficulties.  The intelligence culture, for example, 
requires internal integration of ideals, but procedural, ideological, and territorial rifts 
occur between intelligence community members when they must collaborate or apply a 
feasible internal mechanism externally. 
Schein further describes various elements that explain culture in greater detail.  
He claims the levels of culture include basic underlying assumptions, values, and 
artifacts of the organization (13-14).  Basic assumptions are the ideas and approaches 
that have been implemented so frequently as to become taken for granted.  Basic 
assumptions represent the thought and action processes from which there is no variation 
or deviation since members of a given group or organization “would find behavior 
based on any other premise inconceivable” (18).  These assumptions are similarly 
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described as “’theories-in-use’” or those nondebatable assumptions that guide behavior 
and instruct group members on how to think and feel about things (Schein 18). 
The nondebatable assumptions of the intelligence culture include a workforce 
whose honesty and integrity are beyond reproach, employee screening (to include initial 
and periodic background investigations), compartmentation, need-to-know access 
principles, and guarded information sharing.  A more detailed discussion of these 
assumptions will demonstrate that the basic underlying assumptions of the United States 
intelligence community and the role we expect it and, by extension, its participants or 
employees to play in the conduct of intelligence affairs represent the least significant 
threat to operational security.   
Although some criticize what they consider a culture of secrecy, the public 
generally understands that the collection and analysis of intelligence demands that 
employees and institutions adhere to principles of secrecy and limited disclosure.  
Intelligence professionals, too, are generally cognizant that the manner in which the 
intelligence business gets done requires a mindset that appreciates the need for 
compartmentation and elaborate protocols for information access.  Naturally, there are 
advocates who urge full disclosure of intelligence’s operational funding, sources, and 
methodology, but such demands will not occur since they would undermine intelligence 
functions and could jeopardize the lives of individuals in the intelligence community.  
Difficulties arise, however, when the basic underlying assumptions of the intelligence 
community’s culture become internalized excessively and restrict agencies’ external 
adaptation abilities.   
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For example, intelligence organizations typically stress the need to protect the 
secrecy of operational details.  Agencies safeguard such information in a number of 
ways, including pre- and post-employment briefings and physical as well as technical 
security measures. Occasionally, however, situations arise which expand the circle of 
those persons and entities with a need to know operational information.  Unfortunately, 
intelligence agencies’ prolonged practices of compartmentation and minimizing 
information circulation make expanding the need-to-know pool a difficult process.  The 
task becomes increasingly complicated when the adaptation becomes externalized, or 
when one intelligence agency must (or at least should) share information with another 
organization that embodies the same culture.  In such cases, even the basic underlying 
assumptions about the intelligence community, its purposes, and its protocols become 
clouded and contribute to its occasional inability to prevent or detect security failures. 
The second level of culture addresses an organization’s value systems.  Unlike 
basic underlying assumptions, values are not universally autonomous responses or 
expectations.  Values involve beliefs about what organizations should do rather than 
what they are expected to do based on cultural assumptions.  Values stress the 
importance of prioritization and introduce the element of individualism to 
organizational culture.  Although values may eventually become part of an 
organization’s basic assumptions, whether this occurs depends on many factors,  
including leadership personalities, employee perceptions, and the success of previous 
value-driven approaches to problem solving.  Among the intelligence community’s 
most prominent value issues are degrees of information disclosure, importance of 
monetary gain, and significance of the intelligence mission. 
 14
When a value becomes an approach and the approach proves successful (or 
becomes socially validated), the value begins what Schein labels “cognitive 
transformation,” a process in which values may become synonymous with or part of the 
basic assumptions of an organization (16).  Clearly, not all values complete this 
transformation process successfully as values are intrinsically linked to individual 
beliefs and preferences that are not always malleable.  Due to their individuality, values 
are exceptionally problematic to the intelligence community, and among the three levels 
of culture, they represent the most severe threat to security because of their 
unpredictable and influential nature.  Whereas the first two levels of culture are fluid 
and intangible, the final cultural level consists of identifiable manifestations of an 
organization’s underlying assumptions and value systems. 
Schein labels the third cultural level as “artifacts,” or the “constructed physical 
and social environment” of an organization (14).  Artifacts include physical constructs, 
language patterns, and other outward expressions based on the other cultural elements.  
Among the artifacts specific to the United States intelligence community are physical 
and technical security measures, employee screening and disclosure requirements, and 
periodic reinvestigations of employees and their families.  As the most overt and only 
visible element of the intelligence community’s organizational culture, artifacts 
represent efficient tools that the intelligence establishment may use to address the threat 
posed by the other cultural elements, especially values.  Essentially, the elements of 
culture as defined by Schein create an internalized system of checks and balances where 
divergent values, with the help of a culture’s artifacts, prevent homogenization of 
assumptions that could create a bland organizational identity.  As the following case 
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studies will demonstrate, however, individual values frequently usurp cultural artifacts 
and result in security failures.   
Michael A. Turner echoes Schein and points out that organizational cultures are 
generally positive traits that occur when groups seek to define themselves and protect 
themselves from external environments or threats.  Further cultural development 
typically ensues thereafter in an effort to maximize efficiency and organizational 
effectiveness, especially among subcultures (Turner 261-62).  Turner’s latter point is an 
especially accurate description of the DI : DO subculture dichotomy in the CIA.  
However, if the values of group members are contrary to the values of managerial 
personnel or the majority of the organization, the value difference may fail to optimize 
efficiency and result in what Schein considers a “socialization failure” that weakens a 
generally positive cultural apparatus (42).  As demonstrated by the case studies that 
follow, if employee value systems “run counter to the pivotal assumptions of the total 
organization or the managerial coalition that is in power, the result can be active 
sabotage” (Schein 42).  Undercutting these complications are individual motivations to 
pursue careers in intelligence and the dilemmas employees face after they enter the 
field. 
Public service careers are not characterized by earnings potentials that are 
parallel to employee motivation and ability.  Rather, civil service positions typically pay 
less than their private sector counterparts, have limited promotion potential, and 
compensate employees according to a regimented scale with little (if any) regard for 
individual creativity and productivity.  In the 1960s, President Kennedy’s call to “’ask 
what you can do for your country’” spurred commitments to national idealism and 
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swelled governmental ranks (qtd. in Hitz 15), but the dissolution of the Soviet Union 
and increased economic opportunities outside government service have lessened interest 
in public service careers.  This description begs the question of what compels one to 
seek a career in public service, much less within a discipline with an organizational 
culture as complex as that of the intelligence community.  The explanations are diverse 
and grounded in the theories of the humanist sociologist Abraham Maslow. 
In 1943 Abraham Maslow published “A Theory of Human Motivation” and 
challenged long-standing beliefs that promoted the scientific management principles of 
Max Weber and Frederick Taylor.  Whereas the Weberian approach to management 
emphasized concepts such as formal hierarchies and divisions of labor to increase and 
maintain productivity, Maslow suggested that humans seek to satisfy a hierarchy of 
needs that guide their behavior (Rosenbloom 144, 162).  Satisfaction of these needs, 
Maslow argued, influenced employee behavior more than the rigid structure of 
authoritarianism touted by advocates of scientific management principles.   
Maslow’s hierarchy of needs included physiological, safety, social, self-esteem, 
and self-actualization needs (Rosenbloom 162).  He argued that humans would first 
seek to satisfy physiological needs such as hunger and thirst before attempting to fulfill 
safety needs (such as shelter).  Once workers satisfy these basic needs, they then seek 
social interaction that generally leads to increased self-esteem as a result of social 
identification with family and peer groups.  It is only possible for one to achieve self-
actualization (or true fulfillment) after having satisfied the basic predecessor needs.   
Despite comparatively lower salaries than private sector employment, public 
service careers generally allow needs fulfillment along the Maslowian model.  Career 
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public servants generally have more stable employment situations than non-
governmental employees, and this stability tends to offer immediate satisfaction of 
physiological and safety needs.  Civil servants may then address social and self-esteem 
needs since the organizations of which they are a part are generally less competitive and 
usually comprised of peers with similar interests.  Satisfaction of the basic as well as 
social needs allows the public servant to achieve self-actualization through work-related 
responsibilities as well as functions not related to employment. In addition to these 
benefits, public service careers in the intelligence profession generally offer the added 
bonus of simultaneous needs fulfillment. 
Intelligence professionals not only enjoy the same employment stability and 
benefits packages of other government employees, but they also tend to achieve self-
actualization in concert with satisfaction of lower level needs.  Intelligence careers tend 
to attract idealists who migrate towards careers that offer intrigue, prestige, a sense of 
accomplishment (or self-actualization), and peer recognition.  A career in intelligence 
must provide such non-remunerative rewards since there are few occasions when 
employees may receive public praise for their efforts.  In Organizational Psychology, 
Bernard M. Bass and Edward C. Ryterband discuss the importance of these and other 
employee motivation principles in their condensation of Maslow’s needs theory into 
three broader periods of employee development whose characteristics are especially 
relevant to organizational culture principles.  Their analysis is particularly important 
since the principles they address describe the reality of the intelligence culture as well 
as the obstacles such individual psychological factors represent to the intelligence 
community. 
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According to Bass and Ryterband, the key to employee motivation is “making 
the work itself more meaningful to the ego ideals of the employee” (41).  The authors 
argue that other employment factors such as “supervision, coworkers, salary, working 
conditions, and company policies and practices…reduce dissatisfaction” but do not 
necessarily improve employee motivation (Bass and Ryterband 41).  Employers that 
offer stimuli to encourage self-actualization enjoy a more productive workforce because 
“satisfaction accrues primarily from a sense of accomplishment in a job that has 
personal meaning” (Bass and Ryterband 42).   
In Organizational Psychology, Schein echoes Bass and Ryterband’s conclusions 
and predicts that managerial awareness of individual needs, combined with proactive 
supervisory controls on employee behavior, are essential to increased employee morale 
and organizational success (51).  Schein indicates that according to the rational-
economic assumptions managers make regarding employee motivation, employees will 
derive the greatest motivation from economic incentives and will behave in a manner 
consistent with income maximization (Organizational Psychology 52).  The difficulty in 
applying this assumption to public servants is readily apparent since civil servants’ 
wages are regulated and not specifically tied to individual productivity.  Schein suggests 
managers adopt management approaches that identify and stress Amitai Etzioni’s 
concept of calculative involvement to ensure control and minimize employee 
dissatisfaction (Organizational Psychology 54).  Etzioni’s concept essentially suggests 
that individual participation in an organization is based on “a calculation that 
participating in the organization serves some individual need” (Rosenbloom 158).  
However, as evidenced by the Hawthorne studies, there are numerous social factors that 
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also influence employee activity, and calculative involvement stresses employees’ 
ideological needs rather than their social needs. 
The Hawthorne studies demonstrated the importance of social factors and the 
extent to which employee production, satisfaction, loyalty, and predictability depend on 
the employee’s social relationships within an organization (Rosenbloom 152).  The 
studies revealed satisfaction of individuals’ social needs necessitates a managerial 
approach that imposes authority without sacrificing ideals that are important to 
employees.  The Hawthorne studies emphasized the importance of ensuring work 
assignments, peer interaction, economic incentives, and other reward systems address 
the higher level needs of the employee.  Schein correctly argues that awareness of the 
rational-economic basis for action combined with a managerial strategy that addresses 
social needs allows employee self-actualization.  This approach also encourages 
employee development and allows for unthreatening managerial oversight.  Application 
of such a management strategy is likely to result in reduced levels of employee 
dissatisfaction that may lead to security failures based on a return to self-centered goals 
inherent in the rational-economic model.  
In the intelligence community, potential employees are attracted to the 
unmeasurable benefits of the career, but the absence or weakening of subjective 
motivators may spell disastrous consequences for the employee who requires the 
psychological reinforcement not available otherwise.  When the opportunity for self-
actualization diminishes, the employee “encounters a work environment that gradually 
erodes the initial importance he had placed upon intrinsic task satisfactions and 
promotional rewards.  Although the socioemotional rewards of his work context 
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remained relatively important, eventually work becomes far less meaningful for him” 
(Bass and Ryterband 61-62).  Employees who experience this degree of dissatisfaction 
are prone to disassociate themselves from the organization and its mission and represent 
a significant threat to operational security.  Aldrich Ames, for example, concluded “‘the 
espionage business…was and is a self-serving sham, carried out by careerist bureaucrats 
who have managed to deceive several generations of American policy makers and the 
public about both the necessity and value of their work’” (qtd. in Corn 35). Employees 
who are most likely to experience this level of dissatisfaction include individuals whose 
motivations warrant the designations of “climbers” and “mixed motive employees” 
(Thomas 400). 
Anthony Downs considers “climbers” those self-interested bureaucrats whose 
actions and behavior are motivated “almost entirely by goals that benefit themselves 
rather than their bureaus or society as a whole” (qtd. in Thomas 400).  Among civil 
servants, this trait is most likely to manifest itself after a significant period of 
employment has lapsed.  Within an intelligence organization, a climber “cannot exist 
for long…because the organization’s overwhelming norm is loyalty to something other 
than the self” (Thomas 404).  On the one hand, employees who exhibit extreme 
resentment towards and dissatisfaction with their organization are most likely to exhibit 
climber characteristics, and in most cases should attract the attention of an intelligence 
organization’s artifacts (or security detection mechanisms).   
Mixed-motive officials, on the other hand, tend to have more complicated 
identity issues and may prove more troublesome to identify.  Downs holds that mixed 
motive employees “combine self-interest and altruistic loyalty to larger values” (qtd. in 
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Thomas 400).  In the intelligence community, mixed motive officials “are far more 
common than purely self-interested individuals because most…careerists have some 
degree of altruism” (Thomas 406).  Whereas these traits are desirable and perhaps even 
prerequisites for those pursuing public service careers, the characteristics may also 
create conflicts between the organization’s values and those of the individual.  Jonathan 
Pollard, for example, eventually concluded the United States’s (and therefore the 
ONI’s) value system was not commensurate with the values of his personal ideology.  
Because his motives were not those of the careerist and sought little self-serving 
purposes, his actions represented a greater threat to operational security because his 
espionage activities were less likely to attract the attention of supervisors and security 
authorities.  
The personal motivation issues that complicate the intelligence community’s 
organizational culture are highlighted further by various organizational factors that 
contribute to its unique culture.  Weber postulated that secrecy was a necessary 
characteristic of any bureaucratic operation because it reinforced the hierarchy of 
authority that he believed was central to effective public administration (Rosenbloom 
146).  If any of Weber’s scientific management descriptions are applicable to the 
intelligence community, the call for secrecy is it.  Secrecy requirements are especially 
noticeable during the employee selection process, and the most common examples of 
the secrecy concept include personnel security principles such as the need-to-know 
principle, background investigation, and polygraph examinations (Wettering 270). 
The need-to-know principle requires that “employees be given access only to 
those secrets that they need to know and no others” (Wettering 274).  An extension of 
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this principle is compartmentation, or “restricting access to secret information to only 
those with a need to know” (Wettering 274).  During the applicant screening process, it 
is not uncommon for intelligence organizations to advise prospective hires to limit the 
extent to which they disclose their career ambitions to anyone who does not need to 
know details of the position sought by the applicant.  This recommendation serves two 
purposes.  First, limiting the disclosure of information introduces the applicant to the 
industry standard of limiting information to only those persons with a legitimate need to 
know.  Second, minimizing the disclosure of such seemingly trivial information may 
prevent security failures should the applicant actually become a member of the 
intelligence apparatus.  Simply put, the risk of compromise increases with the rate of 
information disclosure. 
Another truly unique characteristic of the intelligence community’s 
organizational culture is the necessity of determining applicant suitability through the 
use of comprehensive background investigations.  Periodic investigations of intelligence 
officers and analysts are also routine and generally occur in five-year intervals.  As 
artifacts of the intelligence culture, such investigative measures, when used effectively, 
may provide valuable information on an individual’s suitability for employment and 
susceptibility to the influence of other countries’ intelligence services.  Unfortunately, 
although such investigations are obviously beneficial security precautions, the “number 
of people to be screened is beyond the capabilities of the U.S. counterintelligence 
establishment” (Wettering 272).  In addition to background investigation tools such as 
financial reporting (disclosures) and interviews of associates, intelligence organizations’ 
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pre- and post-employment use of the polygraph examination is another cultural icon that 
is unique to the intelligence community. 
The polygraph examination is an artifact of particular benefit to the intelligence 
community’s counterintelligence corps.  Counterintelligence, of course, refers to the 
proactive efforts that seek to deter information disclosure to unauthorized recipients, 
distort operational details through the use of misinformation, and identify internal 
threats to secure operations.  Although the reliability of the polygraph examination is 
debatable, the tool serves three specific counterintelligence purposes: 
First, they intimidate would-be disclosers of secrets from doing so for 
fear of being caught.  Second, when used on a routine basis they can 
reveal deceptions that can lead to confessions, or at least intensive 
scrutiny.  Third, they can be used as a follow-up investigative tool should 
a person come under suspicion from other means.  (Wettering 273) 
 
The need-to-know principle, background investigations, and polygraph examinations 
are necessary security principles, but collectively they contribute to what many consider 
an undesirable culture of secrecy. 
  Former Senator Dennis DeConcini (D., Arizona) once chaired the Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence and observed that the CIA, and by extension the intelligence 
community, have a “’culture of secrecy’ that induces intelligence people [to] have a 
hard time being straightforward” (qtd. in Turner 260).  Congressman Dan Glickman, 
past chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, also noted 
that intelligence agencies tend to “deny that they are doing anything” (qtd. in Turner 
260).  Glickman also noted that in the intelligence community “[t]here is a cult of 
protectiveness, and it runs counter to any external review of their operations” (qtd. in 
Turner 260).  The legislators’ observations pinpoint one of the many difficulties that 
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plague the intelligence community’s organizational culture.  Intelligence agencies must 
treat employees differently than other bureaucratic institutions and conduct their affairs 
behind a veil of secrecy, yet in so doing they run the risk of excessive introversion and 
alienation from their peers, policy makers, the public, and the media.  These intelligence 
community properties also have significant post-employment psychological 
ramifications for individuals who pursue careers in intelligence. 
 Earlier references alluded to promotional opportunities (or the lack thereof) 
within the intelligence community as factors that affected interest in intelligence 
careers.  Upward mobility options also concern veteran careerists, yet the culture of the 
intelligence community historically has sent troubling signals about the bases for 
promotions.  No governmental organization would admit that promotions are based 
solely on individual quotas or empirical data.  After all, unlike private sector interests, 
government service stresses the delivery of services, which are generally not 
quantifiable, as opposed to the delivery of goods, which are easily recorded and 
analyzed.   
In the intelligence community, however, and particularly in the CIA’s 
Directorate of Operations, officers with the highest number of agent recruitments 
generally have received promotions (Riley 256).  Critics allege that “numbers of 
recruitments are what matter…with quality playing second fiddle to quantity” (Riley 
265).  Furthermore, prior to the terrorist attacks against the United States on September 
11, 2001, many intelligence professionals encountered hierarchy of needs conflicts due 
to a lack of mission clarity and purpose that prevent achievement of self-actualization.  
Rather than focused, goal-oriented directives, the intelligence complex has had “lots of 
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people doing many things on many fronts, rather than a focused few going against top 
priority targets…because there are no top priorities, just sundry demands” (Riley 258).  
The Ames study will demonstrate the accuracy of these arguments and illustrate the 
negative impact of such policies on individuals’ assessments of their peers, supervisors, 
and the organization(s) they represent.  The discussion will also address how political 
pressures affect employee perceptions of agency mission and the importance of the 
individual’s contributions to it.   
Intelligence agencies exist to assemble and collect information to create 
intelligence products that assist policy makers in the formulation and implementation of 
United States foreign and domestic policies.  The intelligence community therefore has 
dual spheres of accountability.  Organizations must respond to executive directives 
while complying with both executive mandates and congressional oversights.  This 
accountability to two branches of government automatically politicizes organizations 
that should be immune from political pressures and contributes to the post-employment 
conflicts some intelligence professionals encounter.  On this subject, John A. Gentry 
cites the comments of Jennifer Glaudemans, a former analyst in the CIA’s Directorate 
of Intelligence.  Glaudemans claims that “politicization is like fog” (qtd. in Gentry Ch. 
6).  She also states that “[t]hough you cannot hold it in your hands, or nail it to a wall, it 
does exist, it is real and it does affect people’s behavior” (qtd. in Gentry Ch. 6)  
Nevertheless, executive and legislative requirements require mandatory specialization 
within and across agencies that contributes to individual and cultural conflicts which 
impact security failures. 
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Intelligence collection and analysis are separate functions that necessitate 
divisions of labor reminiscent of Taylorist scientific management principles.  This 
functional division is especially noticeable between the CIA’s Directorate of Operations 
and Directorate of Intelligence, where the basic intelligence culture is subdivided 
further between the directorates.  There is a longstanding rivalry between the DI and 
DO regarding whether intelligence collection or analysis of the raw product is more 
important to policy considerations.  The DO views its role as superior to the DI since 
the collectors assemble the crucial intelligence that would not otherwise be available to 
policy makers.  The DI, in turn, routinely views its role as more important since its 
integration and analysis functions render the crude intelligence usable to policy makers.  
Gentry notes that the culture in the CIA’s DO “contains a streak of 
independence and contempt of accountability” (Gentry Ch. 3).  He also contends the 
DO “jealously guards its information holdings, including those that could be of use to 
the analytic community” (Gentry Ch. 3)   Gentry cites former Directors of Central 
Intelligence James Woolsey and John Deutch as acknowledging the importance of 
cultural change in the DO (Gentry Ch. 3).  Once again, the information sharing 
component of the intelligence community’s organizational culture reflects the difficulty 
that arises when organizations seek to balance need-to-know requirements 
interdepartmentally without jeopardizing the overall intelligence agency mission.   
The information sharing variable and the following factors are among the most 
significant contributions to intelligence organizations’ unique cultural traits.  As 
mentioned previously, employee motivations to pursue careers in intelligence are 
diverse and complex.  A cultural oddity of the intelligence community is the exhaustive 
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hiring process prospective applicants must complete in order to receive a formal offer of 
employment.  Applicants must successfully complete various interviews, psychological 
assessments, and a battery of investigative reviews to determine suitability for 
employment.  Employees must complete these processes mindful of the compensation 
disparities between government and the private sector.  Hitz notes this problem and 
argues that to improve the intelligence community “a campaign should first be mounted 
to lure the best and the brightest men and women to intelligence work” (19).  Hitz also 
suggests that “[t]hese top candidates must be paid a premium” (19).  Additionally, 
employees generally must commit to mobility agreements that subject them to frequent 
travel and reassignment based on the best interests of the government.  Although 
applicants receive notice of these conditions of employment prior to initiation of the 
hiring process, these procedures have few parallels within much less outside 
government and reinforce the distinct nature of their career choices.  This knowledge 
may instill in the employee a sense of invincibility and egoism that complicate 
ideological constructs and may lead to disappointment, dissatisfaction, and 
disenfranchisement with the intelligence mission. 
Earlier reference mentioned the direction and guidance that executive and 
legislative branches of government provide to the intelligence community.  Whereas 
multiple spheres of accountability may create difficulties for intelligence managers, it is 
especially vital that intelligence organizations receive detailed direction to retain a sense 
of mission and purpose.  Referring to the intelligence community, former DCI Richard 
Helms commented that “[t]here is no sense of mission” (qtd. in Turner 269).  Bass and 
Ryterband suggest that “[w]hat holds us to the job, our satisfaction with it, is 
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determined by the extent the job is rewarding to us relative to how much better we 
might do elsewhere, what aspirations we have and what needs are fulfilled by our 
remaining on the job” (68).  Riley suggests that the “intelligence requirements being 
handed down by policymakers today are many, while vision, direction, and leadership 
among those same policymakers is [sic] in short supply” (257).  Without adequate 
direction, intelligence careerists are more likely to become dissatisfied with their 
employment, question the ideological importance of their functions, and seek self-
actualization through alternative means.  Some of these means represent significant 
security threats to intelligence operations. 
Within the intelligence community, staff-level employees must believe that their 
assessments of peer behavior have significance and may contribute to supervisory 
decisions regarding corrective actions and promotion recommendations.  If managerial 
personnel fail to consider peer reports and suggestions or act in a manner that suggests 
supervisors are accountable to a lesser standard than staff employees, they risk 
alienating their subordinates and may cause employees to question whether the position 
they sought on largely ideological grounds retains the primacy it once offered.  
Unfortunately, the intelligence community’s organizational uniqueness only becomes 
more complicated when one considers the impact of ethnicity, counterintelligence, 
interagency territorial disputes, ideological problems, and legal matters on the 





 The mission of the intelligence community necessitates the recruitment of 
personnel from different cultural heritages and academic disciplines.  Intelligence 
agencies could not adequately perform what is expected of them if all employees 
conform to a single, universal mold.  A workforce composed of talented professionals 
with various backgrounds, experiences, and educational disciplines ensures an array of 
values are represented since analysis of nation- or culture-specific intelligence requires 
diverse value systems.  However, the intelligence community also depends on 
adherence to basic underlying assumptions that are not always consistent with diverse 
individual values.  The conflict is obvious.   
Rochelle Klein points out that “[i]t may be difficult or impossible to infuse 
common values and beliefs in such a diverse workforce” (Klein 323).  She also 
indicates that “[e]lements of organizational culture may be incompatible with elements 
of ethnic cultures” (Klein 325).  Klein contends that “[s]ome members of ethnic cultures 
may be unable or unwilling to become part of a particular organizational culture” (325).  
In Taylorist fashion, Klein also suggests that when this conflict occurs, “culture cannot 
be used as the form of communication and control” (335).  She contends that a more 
“explicit, bureaucratic form of organization might then be more effective [since] 
bureaucracies may not require common values and basic assumptions in order to 
perform effectively” (335).  The issue therefore becomes a question of whether 
intelligence organizations should abandon attempts to ensure cultural (ethnic) diversity 
because of the other cultural (value) risk it poses to security.  For the reasons that 
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follow, the risks posed by different value systems do not warrant a homogenous 
intelligence apparatus. 
An ethnically diverse intelligence corps is desirable because the persons with 
whom intelligence professionals must establish relations to collect and analyze human 
intelligence are themselves from diverse ethnic backgrounds.  Ethnicity alone can be a 
useful intelligence tool; it is only logical for a recruited agent to feel more comfortable 
meeting with and providing information to an officer who shares the source’s ethnicity.  
Furthermore, the common ethnical traits increase the believability of explanations for 
meetings between officer and agent.  Wettering observes that “[m]ost of the more than 
50 foreign intelligence services which operate in the United States…practice ethnic 
recruiting,” and the United States intelligence community should continue to use this 
tool despite claims that it is discriminatory (275). 
Maintenance of ethnic diversity is also desirable because it prevents the 
amalgamation of values that results in mirror-imaging.  “Mirror-imaging” is the 
tendency “to view and interpret a foreign country’s words and actions through one’s 
own cultural optic, rather than from the perspective of the foreigners themselves” (Riley 
263).  Robert Callum accurately contends that mirror-imaging is “the fundamental 
weakness of the IC:  with many intelligence professionals cut from the same cultural 
cloth, analysts share ‘unacknowledged biases’ that circumscribe both the definition of 
problems and the search for solutions” (Callum 26).  “The solution,” Callum suggests, 
“is to infuse the IC with a competitive heterogeneity of ideas, cultures, and mindsets by 
pursuing increased diversity and pluralism among analysts” (26).  The increased 
diversity “will lead to improvements in analysis by lessening the impact of shared, 
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common biases” (Callum 27).  Callum succinctly captures the importance of an 
ethnically diverse when he states that “[d]iversity in the IC is not a legal or ethical 
imperative, but rather an analytical one” (30).  He correctly argues that “[t]o understand 
an increasingly complex world, an increasingly diverse work force is needed” (Callum 
30).  Despite the risks that divergent value systems may pose to security, “[c]ontinued 
reliance on a culturally homogenous pool of analysts will doom the United States to 
future ‘intelligence failures’ caused by the projection of ‘our logic’ onto the actions and 
tactics of antagonists” (Callum 30). 
Finally, the intelligence community must seek ethnic diversity for ethical as well 
as operational reasons.  Despite the complications that may arise from the presence of 
various value systems, intelligence organizations need an ethnically diverse work force 
to ensure that agencies do not encounter criticisms such as those encountered by the 
Office of Strategic Services and its incredibly homogenous intelligence cadre.  Ethnic 
diversity should become yet another artifact of the intelligence culture that minimizes 
security threats rather than exacerbates them. 
Yet another factor that complicates the organizational cultures of intelligence 
agencies is the need for and presence of counterintelligence assets.  Counterintelligence 
(CI) efforts are generally offensive or defensive/technical measures that intelligence 
agencies employ to ensure the security of their operations.  These measures contribute 
to more secure operations, but they also foster an atmosphere of paranoia among the 
intelligence community that exacerbates elements of distrust among intelligence 
professionals and limits information sharing and reporting of suspicious behavior.  
Offensive counterintelligence functions typically include recruitment, double agent 
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operations, and defensive measures including “surveillance, personnel and physical 
security, investigations, and police work” (Wettering 266).  Physical security measures 
include the obvious safeguards of passwords, random searches, and password protocols. 
As mentioned previously, personnel security includes procedures such as background 
investigations and polygraph examinations, but a subsidiary component of personnel 
security includes programs that aim to detect employees with substance abuse problems, 
income and lifestyle disparities, and spousal issues that might affect employees’ 
suitability for stewardship of classified information.  The case studies that follow will 
demonstrate that across the intelligence organization spectrum, the community’s 
disregard for these unique artifacts was largely responsible for the intelligence failures 
that occurred. 
There are also administrative issues that complicate the intelligence 
community’s organizational culture and the extent that culture affects security failures.  
As demonstrated by the Ames affair, many intelligence professionals question the 
efficacy of reporting problematic or suspicious employees whose actions constitute 
security threats.  Supervisory responses to such complaints have not been productive.  
One reason for this lack of confidence in supervisory reactions stems from other 
cultural observations.  The extant intelligence culture “not only protects its own, it 
punishes those who blow the whistle by objecting to lax discipline” (Turner 262).  One 
intelligence official opined that “[f]ingering colleagues is considered unfair, leading to 
the failure…to punish individuals for past counterintelligence failures” (qtd. in Turner 
262).  An out-of-sight, out-of-mind mentality has been pervasive and resulted in unit 
reorganizations, transfers, and promotions of intelligence personnel whose actions are 
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not consistent with attributes that intelligence organizations value.  Former CIA 
Inspector General Frederick Hitz noted that during his tenure at the agency 
“counterintelligence snafus didn’t slow the advance of implicated officials but somehow 
served to advance them” (CIA OIG Abstract 17).  Hitz noted that a “[s]crew up and 
move up” approach to addressing problem employee issues resulted in the promotion of 
personnel whose performance warranted discipline rather than praise (CIA OIG 
Abstract 17).  Gentry echoes Hitz’s observation and notes that one former analyst in the 
CIA’s Office of Soviet Analysis observed how frequently supervisors received transfers 
and/or promotions: 
From April 1986 until August 1987, I had four different branch chiefs 
and from April 1985 until August 1987 I had four different division 
chiefs and I never changed jobs….When I worked on Soviet policy 
toward the United States from January 1988 until I left [CIA] in 
November 1989, I also had four different branch chiefs, two division 
chiefs and two group chiefs.   
 
It is unlikely that such a promotion pace is attributable to exemplary performance.  
Rather, it is more likely that the high degree of turnovers in supervisory positions is at 
least partly attributable to transfers or promotions of supervisory employees whose 
performance was substandard. 
Unfortunately, transfers and promotions of employees who pose risks to security 
sometimes occur despite coworkers’ reporting of suspicious or inappropriate behavior.  
Management theorist Jay Forrester discusses the importance of employee reporting 
mechanisms and supervisory responses to such reports: 
If an organization is to deal with problems effectively, they have to be 
brought out into the open before they become too serious to manage.  For 
this to happen, employees must know that managers will respond to the 
bad news itself, rather than shoot the messenger.  They also have to 
know that, although it may not result in management action, all 
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thoughtful dissent will receive a fair and honest hearing.  This kind of 
open environment is particularly crucial if an organization is to surface 
potential ethical dilemmas, which there is great incentive to cover up.  
(qtd. in Pekel) 
 
Gentry, however, notes that existing grievance systems in the intelligence community 
are inadequate counterintelligence tools.  He cites a report issued by the CIA Office of 
Inspector General that charges “employees are loathe to use a grievance system to 
redress a wrong” (qtd. in Gentry Ch. 3). Employee distrust of supervisors and 
managerial mishandling of reported security violations leave employees few options 
other than submission of complaints to the various Inspectors General assigned to 
intelligence agencies.  However, most employees are reluctant to utilize this resource as 
well. 
 The Office of Inspector General (OIG) is truly an ambitious concept.  
Supposedly, the OIG is an independent investigative arm that conducts civil and 
criminal investigations of a given agency and exercises additional oversight functions as 
well.  The OIG is allegedly immune from the influence of agency chiefs and expected to 
enforce accountability standards without regard to political influences that might be 
brought to bear.  Employees are oftentimes reluctant to report suspicious behavior to the 
OIG in recognition of the disastrous career consequences such actions may have on the 
individual reported should the allegations not be substantiated.  Former Deputy Director 
for Intelligence Douglas MacEachen notes this hindrance and states that “the Inspector 
General will never come back and say you’re absolved” (qtd. in Gentry Ch. 3).  
MacEachen also claims that the subject of an OIG inquiry “will never be definitely 
acquitted” (qtd. in Gentry Ch. 3).  He contends OIG personnel “will say we found no 
evidence to substantiate it” but will never pronounce innocence (qtd. in Gentry Ch. 3). 
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Many employees therefore choose the lesser of two evils and allow managerial 
personnel to determine whether the information they provide on suspected 
vulnerabilities becomes the basis for more in-depth investigations.   
Despite the inadequacy of these internal mechanisms to address security threats, 
and although law enforcement agencies have organizational cultures that in many ways 
are considerably similar to intelligence agencies, for the reasons that follow, 
intelligence professionals are loathe to request the assistance of criminal investigators 
and the intelligence assets of law enforcement.  As do intelligence organizations, law 
enforcement agencies also have vested interests in establishing selective processes for 
hiring new personnel.  The motivations of those who seek law enforcement careers are 
similarly unique to that profession as are the motivations specific to the intelligence 
community.  Law enforcement personnel have understandable reasons for safeguarding 
operational information, and the agencies have probable cause to stress information 
disclosure guidelines given the nature of their functions.  Law enforcement agencies 
and their staffs share significant cultural characteristics with their intelligence brethren, 
but the momentous differences in ideology between the organizations also contribute to 
significant security weaknesses.  Observations of the historic relationship between the 
FBI and CIA will illustrate the difficulties mentioned. 
 Prior to the passage of National Security Act of 1947, the FBI had responsibility 
for the collection of all information related to espionage activities directed against the 
United States (Turner 263).  In response to the attack on Pearl Harbor, however, 
Congress passed the 1947 Act to establish a national clearinghouse of intelligence to 
minimize the possibility of recurrent catastrophes.  The CIA’s predecessor, the Office of 
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Strategic Services (OSS), received responsibility for the collection of foreign 
intelligence and the conduct of covert operations outside the United States.  Unlike 
cultural characteristics, the law enforcement : intelligence dichotomy and the 
restrictions that regulate the agencies are statutory. 
 Title 50 of the United States Code addresses war and national defense concerns.  
Section 403-3(d)(1) states that the Director of Central Intelligence (and by extension all 
other intelligence agencies) shall “collect intelligence through human sources and by 
other appropriate means, except that the Agency shall have no police, subpoena, or law 
enforcement powers or internal security functions.”   In addition, Executive Order 
12333 further delineates what authority the intelligence apparatus enjoys to accomplish 
its directives and the point at which intelligence jurisdiction ends and law enforcement 
responsibility begins.  Executive Order 12333 also states that one of the goals of the 
national intelligence effort is as follows: 
To the greatest extent possible consistent with applicable United States 
law and this Order, and with full consideration of the rights of United 
States persons, all agencies and departments should seek to ensure full 
and free exchange of information in order to derive maximum benefit 
from the United States intelligence effort.   
 
Ironically, the cultural traits that the intelligence community shares with law 
enforcement agencies create rifts between the two complexes and handicap the 
information sharing principles that Executive Order 12333 suggests.  The token 
information that the organizations do exchange is frequently insufficient, open-source 
material.  The information’s lack of intelligence value or delinquency of its delivery  
may result in preventable security failures.  This unwillingness to share information 
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openly is attributable to the ideological differences between law enforcement and 
intelligence. 
 The differences between law enforcement and intelligence “are not only 
cultural…but legal, operational, and methodological” (Hulnick 275). One FBI 
counterintelligence officer observes that the FBI’s approach differs markedly from that 
of the CIA.  The official describes the intelligence approach as offensive and believes 
that law enforcement strategies tend to be defensive (Turner 265).  These differences 
have “led to isolation…which engendered…the rise of separate procedures, separate 
points of view, and separate cultures” (Turner 265).  Operationally, “intelligence 
officers want to exploit their sources and law enforcement personnel want to make 
convictions” (Hulnick 276).  Former DCI Robert Gates also acknowledged these 
ideological differences and summarized them by declaring that law enforcement “wants 
to arrest and prosecute people and put them in jail, and the intelligence folks want to use 
information to get more information” (qtd. in Turner 265). For intelligence 
professionals, the “recruitment is not a ‘one-time’ deal” in that intelligence officers 
expect sources to be long-term producers of information that analysts can integrate to 
create predictors and assessments useful to policy makers (Hulnick 276).  However, it is 
not unusual for law enforcement to recruit confidential informants for one specific 
operation.  Despite their differing recruitment objectives, however, the law enforcement 
community is “just as eager to protect its sources, and is equally reluctant to divulge 
information outside the law enforcement community,” much less trust disclosure of the 
information to intelligence agencies (Hulnick 276).   
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A recent report issued by the National Commission on Terrorism also echoed 
this problem.  The Commission concluded that the “federal government is stymied by 
bureaucratic and cultural obstacles to the quick and broad collection of important 
intelligence” (qtd. in Kitfield “Covert” 2861).  The Commission also determined that 
“law enforcement, defense, and intelligence agencies too often seem more interested in 
defending their turf than in coordinating their efforts and sharing sensitive intelligence” 
(qtd. in Kitfield “Covert” 2861).  Ideological differences between law enforcement and 
intelligence are also compounded by legal concerns specific to the organizational 
functions of each group. 
 The law enforcement community’s approach toward recruiting informants and 
collecting evidence stems from its mission of obtaining criminal convictions.  Whereas 
intelligence organizations assemble and analyze investigative information that is not 
subject to rules of evidence, law enforcement seeks exculpatory information that can be 
introduced in legal proceedings to secure convictions (Hulnick 277).  Convictions 
dictate criminal trials, and trials require the production of exculpatory information and 
evidentiary procedures that demand adherence to legal rules of discovery.   For these 
reasons, law enforcement operations are held to legal and ethical standards not levied on 
intelligence agencies whose operations, most of which occur outside the United States, 
are not subject to legal restrictions imposed on law enforcement.    
The 1948 trial of Judith Coplon further complicated (for the government) the 
dichotomy between evidentiary requirements and intelligence sources and methods.  
Coplon was convicted on charges of unauthorized disclosure of classified information 
after she was caught providing information to a romantic interest who was a KGB 
 39
operative.  Coplon’s legal counsel demanded and received the right to all FBI 
information related to the charges against the defendant.  Although the FBI turned over 
most of the information subject to discovery, Coplon’s conviction was overturned later 
partly because the United States refused to deliver information from the VENONA 
materials that identified Coplon’s espionage activities (Wettering 290).  VENONA is 
the code name that refers to the signals intelligence intercepts that allowed the United 
States to detect numerous cases of Soviet espionage conducted by Americans during the 
1940s and 1950s (Lowenthal 102).  The threat that secret information might be obtained 
by defense counsel is known as “greymail” and limits prosecutors’ abilities to introduce 
classified information as evidence at trail for fear the information might compromise 
intelligence (or law enforcement) sources and methodology (Wettering 290).   
Under discovery rules, evidence that may be introduced in criminal trials must 
be shared with the defendant’s legal counsel, and because “this information must 
eventually be revealed to the defense in a trial, protection of sources and methods 
becomes impossible” (Hulnick 277).  Compromise of sources and methods is anathema 
to both law enforcement and intelligence communities, but unlike intelligence 
organizations, law enforcement and prosecutors accept such disclosures as necessary to 
accomplishment of their missions.   
In an attempt to address the problem posed by “greymail,” Congress, in 1980, 
passed the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA).  In compliance with 
discovery rules, the CIPA allows ex parte and in camera presentation of classified 
information to a judge so the court might determine, outside defense counsel’s presence, 
(1) whether the disclosure of classified information is relevant to the legal proceedings 
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and (2) whether the release of that information would jeopardize current, former, or 
future intelligence or law enforcement operations (Wettering 290).  Obviously, defense 
counsels must receive relevant information, but operational information that is not 
crucial to the prosecution or defense of the defendant is no longer subject to automatic 
defense scrutiny.  The Department of Justice sought relief under the CIPA as recently as 
March 5, 2001, in its request to the court for a protective order to restrict the amount of 
classified information the prosecution had to release to Robert P. Hanssen’s attorneys 
and further limit defense counsel’s ability to share such information with the defendant 
(Frieden). 
One of the unique characteristics of government is the difficulty of measuring 
the success of administration of public services.  Empirical analysis of service delivery 
is generally not possible, so most surveys of government performance must measure 
subjective factors such as citizen satisfaction with a particular department or program.  
Like most other governmental agencies, the law enforcement and intelligence 
communities must demonstrate that their accomplishments warrant, at a minimum, 
continued funding levels, and, ideally, increased financial support.  Agencies with 
intelligence functions therefore legitimize their budgets by measuring the number of 
sources recruited, analyses produced, and, to a lesser extent, catastrophes avoided.  The 
budgetary logic simply assumes that x dollars will achieve y results.  It also presumes 
that increased funding has a direct correlation with increased recruitments, analyses, 
and other intelligence products.  This mentality is problematic in that it suggests 
quantity supersedes quality of information and may compel intelligence professionals to 
sacrifice ideals and values in favor of meeting recruitment and production quotas.  As 
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was the case with Aldrich Ames, employees may compromise their own integrity and 
jeopardize operational security for the sake of career advancement influenced by 
inflated quota systems.   
The organizational culture of the intelligence community is a complicated 
combination of assumptions, values, and expectations.  Line-level intelligence 
employees and their supervisors have difficulty reconciling the cultural attributes with 
the demands of the profession.  For example, the intelligence culture limits the extent to 
which intelligence professionals may discuss their employment with their partners.  
Additionally, intelligence employees typically may not publicize intelligence successes, 
but they must tolerate public and media criticism of alleged intelligence failures.  The 
difficulty of this cultural balancing act is lost on the public, for its exposure to the 
intelligence community is limited, and its understanding of the intelligence 
community’s unique organizational culture is practically nonexistent.  Due in part to 
this lack of understanding, the public’s perceptions of intelligence operations also 
impact (and complicate) the organizational culture of the intelligence community. 
As early as 1830, Alexis de Tocqueville noted in Democracy in America that 
“democracies are not good at secrecy or perseverance in foreign affairs” (qtd. in 
Wettering 291).  His nineteenth century analysis was on target then and remains 
accurate today.  Americans by and large are intolerant of secretive governmental 
operations.  Consider, for example, the public reaction to the Watergate episode of the 
1970s.  Public outcries for complete disclosure of operational funding, sources, and 
methodology are increasingly common.  For operational reasons, full disclosure is 
obviously not possible, but part of the problem that nags the intelligence community is 
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its inability to broadcast the positive results of its efforts whereas the media readily 
reports on alleged intelligence failures and abuses. 
Events such as the Iran-Contra affair of the 1980s and the CIA’s recruitment of 
sources of information with alleged histories of human rights violations cause the public 
to question the ethical standards of intelligence.  Such criticisms have become so 
influential that in 1995 DCI George Tenet issued what became known as the “scrub 
order,” a directive restricting CIA officers’ abilities to recruit agents with unsavory or 
questionable backgrounds (“Regulations”).  Following the terrorist attacks of September 
11, 2001, the CIA clarified the directive and asserted that “those guidelines have been 
changed to allow field officers greater latitude in making such decisions” (CIA  
“Terrorism”).  Nonetheless, the issuance of the “scrub order” reflects Americans’ 
inherent distrust of secrets and, to an even greater degree, informers. 
When Linda Tripp produced audiocassette recordings of her conversations with 
Monica Lewinsky in which the former White House intern acknowledged salacious 
details of her relationship with former President Clinton, the public perceived Tripp as a 
disloyal tipster with selfish interests.  In the public’s eye, Tripp was an untrustworthy 
tattler who violated the sanctity of her relationship with Lewinsky (Wettering 291).  
Tripp’s revelations labeled her an informer, and the United States public expressed its 
disrespect for her actions and motives.  Clearly, intelligence organizations are not 
informers because the data collected and analyzed by the intelligence community does 
not serve the interests of individual agencies.  The intelligence mission serves the 
interests of the United States’s national security, but in order to assemble such 
intelligence, agencies must associate with persons and groups whose motives and means 
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are suspect. It is therefore only natural for the public to infer that intelligence 
professionals’ mores are suspect also since members of the intelligence community 
sometimes must operate at the same level as the informants who provide intelligence.  
This connection simply reinforces the public’s specific distrust of intelligence and 
general suspicions of government. 
Historically, Americans have been apprehensive of a strong central government.  
The Articles of Confederation were intentionally weak because of this fear, and it was 
only after addition of the Bill of Rights that some states ratified the United States 
Constitution (Wettering 291).  By necessity, intelligence organizations conduct most of 
their affairs in secret, and many assume secrecy translates to centralized, unchecked 
authority with little respect for individual rights and liberties.  Civil libertarians 
routinely decry what they consider the intelligence community’s culture of secrecy and 
argue that agencies’ claims of the necessity for secrecy are merely obfuscations for the 
continued existence of a culture that ensures centrality of authority. 
One of the most vocal advocates of openness in government is former United 
States Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan.  Moynihan’s chief gravamen is that with the 
demise of a bipolar international system, there is no longer a need for the culture of 
secrecy that characterized the Cold War.  He contends that a “culture of secrecy need 
not be the norm in the American government regarding national security” (Moynihan 
55).  Moynihan believes that “[t]o achieve greater efficiency, laws must be created to 
restrain the present culture of secrecy and promote a competing culture of openness” 
(55). 
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One of the armaments in Moynihan’s arsenal of criticism is the incredible 
number of documents classified at the Confidential, Secret, and Top Secret level.  Of 
particular concern to him is the government’s unwillingness to declassify relics of 
bygone eras.  Moynihan suggests that “organizations within a culture of secrecy will opt 
for classifying as much as possible, and for as long as possible” for both budgetary and 
authoritarian concerns (69).  Just as lawmakers and senior government officials rely on 
recruitment figures and analyses as indicators for fiscal decisions, those in positions of 
authority also gauge agencies’ need for funding in part on the number of classified 
documents an organization generates.  Moynihan points to former President Clinton’s 
Executive Order 12958 which, in 1995, resulted in over 374,244 documents receiving 
derivative designation as Top Secret for the information they contained.  Moynihan’s 
concern is legitimate, since excessive classification can impact negatively the agencies 
where organizational culture ingrained the initial determination that such classifications 
are necessary.  Former Senator Moynihan suggests that the “system can become so 
constrictive that information is effectively withheld from those who need it” (64)  
Unfortunately, a cultural trait that allows the intelligence community to complete its 
objectives admirably under most circumstances may, in extreme circumstances, 
compete with itself and hinder the establishment’s fulfillment of policy makers’ and the 
public’s expectations.   
Given the problems associated with such information withholding, one might 
wonder whether agencies value budgetary allotments more than mission success.  It 
would be unfair to make such an accusation since that stance applies a blanket distrust 
of intelligence professionals.  Nonetheless, in fairness, it is evident that agency pride 
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and perceptions of strength and seniority are also complicit in interagency withholdings 
of intelligence.  “Power in a culture of secrecy frequently derives from withholding 
secrets,” Moynihan observes, and he points to the FBI’s unwillingness to share with the 
CIA decoded VENONA messages until four years after the FBI received the 
information from the military intelligence assets of the United States Army (70).  
Despite the historical precedents in favor of increased information sharing and a 
revision of the culture of secrecy, Moynihan realistically points out that a “culture of 
openness will never develop within government until the present culture of secrecy is 
restrained by statute” (65).  Such legislation, however, is far from imminent. 
The preceding discussion has identified numerous cultural traits that are unique 
to organizations directly engaged in the collection and analysis of intelligence as well as 
those law enforcement agencies whose missions require adoption of specific cultural 
attributes.  The cultural characteristics of the intelligence community include elements 
of secrecy, distrust and suspicion of peers and outsiders, severe compartmentation of 
information, and limited information sharing among community members.  Other 
characteristics include employee motivation problems, compensation inequities, and 
conflicts that arise between ethnic and cultural diversity.  Academicians and social 
scientists have recognized the unique nature of these traits, and organizational theory 
scholars as well as intelligence veterans have recognized that intelligence organizations 
must apply or exhibit these cultural traits in order to produce the product on which 
policy makers depend to make informed national security decisions.   
Kent Pekel points to Paine’s analysis and confirms that unethical behavior 
“involves tacit, if not explicit, cooperation of others and reflects the values, attitudes, 
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beliefs, language, and behavioral patterns that define an organization’s operating 
culture” (qtd. in Pekel).  Unfortunately, the organizational characteristics of the 
intelligence community compel it to be culturally insular and further distance the 
establishment from those segments of government and society that need not observe 
these cultural peculiarities (Corn 34).  This separation contributes to assumptions about 
and misunderstandings of the intelligence community that exacerbate the perception of 
intelligence agencies as secretive, authoritarian entities that threaten civil liberties. 
 Applying Schein’s organizational construct, the basic underlying assumptions, 
values, and artifacts of the intelligence community are responsible for significant 
security and counterintelligence failures.  Review of the espionage activities of Jonathan 
Pollard, Aldrich Ames, and Robert Hanssen, and the cultural environment that allowed 
such behavior demonstrates that although their disclosures were unquestionably 
devastating to the intelligence community, there are valuable lessons to be learned from 
their behaviors and the organizational responses to those actions.  It is probable that 
intelligence, counterintelligence, and security professionals will not detect all security 
compromises, but awareness of the cultural contributions to certain landmark failures 
may prevent future security and counterintelligence disasters. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
POLLARD CASE STUDY 
 
On November 21, 1985, agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation watched 
in anticipation and surprise as the green Ford Mustang they had surveilled throughout 
the morning entered the driveway of the Israeli embassy in Washington, D.C.  The 
driver and owner of the vehicle was Jonathan Jay Pollard, an intelligence research 
specialist who worked for the Office of Naval Intelligence.  Also present in the vehicle 
was Pollard’s wife, Anne Henderson Pollard.  The Pollards were the subject of FBI 
surveillance because just days earlier, the FBI and Naval Investigative Service had 
begun questioning Pollard about his unauthorized removal, possession, and distribution 
of classified national security information.  Although Pollard had acknowledged during 
earlier interviews that he had inappropriately handled classified documents, agents did 
not arrest Pollard immediately since he appeared to be cooperating with their 
investigation and claimed to have additional information of relevance to criminal 
investigators and counterintelligence staff assigned to the investigation.  Nonetheless, 
investigators were rightly suspect of the information Pollard had already provided, and 
the agents were concerned that if given the opportunity, Pollard would attempt to leave 
the United States.  Agents were also hopeful that Pollard might lead the investigators to 
his handlers or foreign government officials on whose behalf Pollard had allegedly 
committed espionage.  Their suspicions proved true, for out of fear, desperation, and a 
hope for a miracle, Pollard sought refuge and protection at the embassy of Israel, one of 
the United States’s most loyal allies and the country on whose behalf Pollard had 
committed espionage.   
 48
 Most states subscribe to an international legal standard establishing an embassy 
and the property on which it is located as the domain of the sovereign nation it 
represents.  The Israeli embassy, for example, although physically situated in northwest 
Washington, D.C., is considered to be an extension of the Israeli State.  Therefore, when 
Jonathan and Anne Pollard entered the Israeli embassy grounds, the agents surveilling 
the Pollards did not enter the Israeli premises because the embassy technically was 
considered outside the United States, and law enforcement agents had no authority to 
pursue their suspects.  However, much to the Pollards’ astonishment, shortly after their 
arrival at what they considered a safe haven from United States law enforcement, Israeli 
embassy officials demanded the Pollards leave the embassy.  The government of Israel 
denied the Pollards the safe escape they had been promised, and with nowhere else to 
go, the Pollards departed the embassy grounds and were placed under immediate arrest 
by the FBI.  As the FBI had hoped, Pollard had led agents to the front door of the state 
to which Pollard had disclosed significant amounts of classified national security 
information.  Expecting a heroic reception from those whom he considered his fellow 
countrymen, Pollard received only a thankless dismissal. 
Later that very Thursday, Jonathan Jay Pollard appeared before the Honorable 
Patrick Attridge, a United States Magistrate for the District of Columbia.  Pollard 
learned that he was charged with violating Title XVIII, Section 794 (a) of the United 
States Code, alleging that Pollard, “during November of 1985…with intent and reason 
to believe that it was used to the advantage of a foreign nation, did communicate and 
deliver to a foreign government directly or indirectly documents, writings, and 
information to the national defense” (qtd. in Blitzer 181).  If found guilty of this charge, 
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Pollard faced a maximum penalty of death, or imprisonment for any term, up to life.  At 
the arraignment, Attridge also advised Pollard that he also was charged with violating 
Title XVIII, Section 793 (e) of the United States Code, “which makes it unlawful to 
possess any documents and writings relating to the national defense and willfully retain 
the same and fail to deliver them to the officer or employee of the United States entitled 
to receive them” (qtd. in Blitzer 181).  The maximum penalty for conviction on this 
count was a fine of up to $10,000, up to ten years of imprisonment, or both. 
Jonathan Jay Pollard was the first of two Pollards to appear before Magistrate 
Attridge for arraignment on criminal charges.  On Monday, November 25, 1985, Anne 
Henderson Pollard also appeared and learned that she, too, was charged with violating 
Section 793 (e) of Title XVIII, United States Code, or “unauthorized possession and 
transmission of classified documents” (qtd. in Blitzer 187).  Anne Pollard also faced 
penalties of up to ten years imprisonment or a fine of up to $10,000, or both, if 
convicted of this crime.   
On June 4, 1986, Jonathan and Anne Pollard returned to the United States 
District Court in Washington, D.C.  Jonathan Pollard advised Judge Aubrey Robinson, 
III, of his intent to plead guilty to conspiracy to commit espionage, or Title XVIII, 
United States Code, Section 794 (c).  Anne Pollard similarly acknowledged her intent to 
plead guilty to one count of conspiracy to receive embezzled government property, in 
violation of Title XVIII, United States Code, Section 371.  Anne Pollard also agreed to 
plead guilty to Sections 793 (e) and 3 of Title XVIII, which is accessory after the fact to 
possession of national defense documents (Blitzer 244). 
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The Pollards—indeed, most who followed the investigation—expected Anne 
Pollard to receive a suspended sentence based on her poor medical condition and plea 
agreement with prosecutors.  Most watchers also expected Jonathan Pollard would 
receive a sentence of imprisonment of up to twenty-five years, a significant but reduced 
sentence based on his guilty plea and promise to cooperate fully with investigators.  
Government prosecutors had in fact agreed to recommend only a substantial sentence 
for Pollard instead of seeking the maximum penalty.  Neither the Pollards nor 
courtroom observers expected the sentences Judge Robinson rendered.  After having 
heard arguments by defense counsel and prosecutors for and against Jonathan and Anne 
Henderson Pollard, Judge Robinson pronounced 
With respect to the defendant Jonathan Pollard, who is being sentenced 
for violation of Title XVIII, United States Code, Section 794 (c), I 
commit the defendant to the custody of the Attorney General or his 
authorized representative for his life.  With respect to the defendant, 
Anne Henderson Pollard, I commit the defendant Anne Henderson 
Pollard to the custody of the Attorney General or his authorized 
representative on the first count of the information to a period of five 
years.  (qtd. in Blitzer 270–271) 
 
At present, Jonathan Jay Pollard has served approximately 16 years of his life sentence.  
Anne Pollard has served her sentence and is no longer in prison.   Jonathan Jay Pollard, 
however,  remains incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution in Butner, North 
Carolina.   
 The basis for Jonathan Pollard’s arrest for and subsequent admission to 
espionage charges began on May 29, 1984.  On that date at the Washington Hilton 
Hotel in Washington, D.C., Pollard met with an Israeli representative and matter-of-
factly advised his contact that “he wanted to provide classified documents and 
information,” and he “described the position which he held and the nature of the 
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classified intelligence information and documents he could provide” (Blitzer 75).  Over 
the next 20 months, Pollard would provide Israel with significant amounts of classified 
United States documents.  Subsequent investigations and Pollard’s confessions would 
reveal that Pollard “sold to Israel a volume of classified information ten feet by six feet 
by six feet” (Blitzer 259).  Although he ultimately received compensation in exchange 
for his espionage activities, Pollard’s initial motivation to provide Israel with classified 
information was not financial.  His primary motive was ideological, and the factors that 
contributed to the value system that shaped Pollard’s ideology represent one of the 
many challenges and difficulties of the intelligence community’s organizational culture.  
Other organizational culture principles that contributed to the security failure 
represented by Pollard’s espionage include physical and personnel security practices, 
information sharing principles, peer reporting norms, and spousal support for illegal 
activities. 
 Earlier discussions of employee motivations revealed that the intelligence 
community’s objectives demand a diverse workforce for its information collection 
benefits and prevention of mirror-imaging tendencies.  The intelligence establishment 
must therefore contend with employees whose value systems are far from uniform, and 
whose motivations for seeking careers in the intelligence field are equally diverse.  
Nonetheless, ethnic diversity is crucial to the United States establishment since such 
diversity prevents mirror-imaging tendencies and ensures a variety of viewpoints on 
intelligence matters.   Among Schein’s descriptions of the levels of culture, this author 
argued that cultural values are the greatest threat to the security of the intelligence 
establishment.  In Pollard’s case, this intelligence research specialist most accurately 
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fits the mold of Anthony Downs’s mixed motive classification, and the inherent 
conflicts of such a personality run counter to the efficacy of intelligence organizations 
(Thomas 404). 
 Jonathan Pollard grew up in an academic environment.  His father, Dr. Morris 
Pollard, was a respected microbiologist who served on the faculties of institutions such 
as the University of Notre Dame and Cambridge University.  Dr. Pollard’s career 
entailed periods abroad for the family and ensured Jonathan Pollard’s exposure to 
elitism if not idealism through his familial engagement with scholars and academicians.  
The Pollard family also instilled in Jonathan Pollard the importance of his Jewish 
heritage, but whereas his parents were extremely pro-American, Jonathan Pollard’s 
devotion was to Israel first and foremost.  “For as long as I can remember,” Pollard 
stated in an interview, “Israel has figured prominently in my life as an object of 
religious commitment as well as a source of personal strength” (qtd. in Blitzer 19).  
Pollard believed it was possible to rationalize illegal behavior through religious and 
nationalist justification so long as the rationalized behavior served a greater good than 
the wrong represented: 
I was brought up with the notion that this kind of service was not 
breaking the law but was the discharge, as I say, of a racial obligation.  
Certainly, it was made easier by the fact that as far as I was 
concerned…there was no difference between being a good American and 
a good Zionist. (qtd. in Blitzer 20) 
 
Events in Israel only reinforced the ideologies to which Pollard had been exposed as a 
minor. 
 The 1967 Six-Day War greatly influenced Pollard’s convictions about his duties 
to Israel.  “That was the turning point for me,” Pollard claimed (qtd. in Blitzer 25).  His 
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concern over the possible destruction of Israel was complemented by a trip to the 
concentration camp at Dachau in 1968, which, he claimed, “gave palpable expression to 
the teachings of what could happen when Jews take their existence for granted,” 
whereupon he came to believe that “every Jew had a responsibility, an obligation” to 
ensure that a catastrophe such as the Holocaust does not happen again (qtd. in Blitzer 
27-28).  These events collectively established a mixed-motive construct for Pollard, and 
his educational pursuits only reinforced what he considered dual loyalties to the United 
States and Israel. 
 After initially pursuing pre-medicine training at Stanford University, Pollard 
changed his major to political science.  One of Pollard’s former roommates recalled 
Pollard’s interests included military history and intelligence operations, and he 
described Pollard as “definitely pro-Israel” (qtd. in Blitzer 35).  Other collegiate 
associates recalled Pollard claimed to have worked for the Mossad, Israel’s clandestine 
intelligence service, and even Pollard’s father noted his son’s fascination with 
intelligence.  Pollard’s father observed that Jonathan Pollard was “filled with 
romanticism” about a career in intelligence (qtd. in Blitzer 39).   Pollard’s commitment 
to a career in intelligence merged with his devout ideology in 1973 during the Yom 
Kippur War.  It was during this event that Pollard “decided the intelligence field would 
provide…a skill which would be well received in Israel” (qtd. in Blitzer 40).  Pollard’s 
commitment to an intelligence profession, however, was blighted by his allegiance to 
Israel.  Although Pollard was infatuated with pursuing an intelligence career, his 
allegiance to Israel overshadowed his loyalty to his chosen profession.  Pollard believed 
that “[p]ersonal involvement was…the mark of a responsible individual” (qtd. in Blitzer 
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43).  Blitzer observes that intelligence operations and the organizations that conducted 
them “simply could not satisfy that need” Pollard felt to make proactive contributions to 
a cause he considered more important than his professional obligations (Blitzer 43).  
After graduation from Stanford, Pollard briefly pursued legal studies at the 
University of Notre Dame and graduate work at the Fletcher School of Law and 
Diplomacy at Tufts University.  After his first year at Fletcher, Pollard participated in 
an internship at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island.  Pollard personally 
observed that  “[t]he psychological hallmarks of divided loyalties were certainly there 
for all to see:  the uneasy conscience, the sense of personal failure” (qtd. in Blitzer 47).  
Pollard notes that he was “becoming a weak man with good intentions and doomed by 
pride” (qtd. in Blitzer 47).  Pollard, however, again rationalized his motivations.  He 
believed that his commitment to Israel was not inconsistent with the interests of the 
United States.  “They are not incompatible goals as far as I am concerned,” Pollard 
claimed (qtd. in Blitzer 48).  Having reconciled these incongruities, Pollard sought 
employment with the CIA but did not secure a position because of his drug use during 
college.  The CIA’s rejection of Pollard marked the beginning of his disenfranchisement 
with the intelligence apparatus, and his future employment with Naval Intelligence 
would only supplement his dissatisfaction with his chosen profession. 
Pollard began his intelligence career as an intelligence research specialist with 
the United States Navy in 1979.  Pollard immediately encountered what this author 
described as a homogenous intelligence structure that necessitated ethnic diversity 
among intelligence professionals.  “I was totally unprepared for the level and extent of 
the anti-Semitism that was tolerated within the organization,” Pollard later noted (qtd. in 
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Blitzer 52).  His encounter with this cultural manifestation only reinforced his devotion 
to Israel and contributed to his voluntary disclosure of national security secrets.  
Pollard’s experiences in Naval Intelligence only exaggerated his unhappiness.  Anne 
Henderson urged her husband to leave the intelligence field, but Pollard remained.  
Pollard’s continued involvement in intelligence allowed him to witness the United 
States’s guarded information-sharing practices, and “he concluded that the United 
States was not providing Israel with enough classified information to enable it to 
strengthen its own military capability” (Blitzer 60).   
The United States’s reluctance to authorize complete disclosure of intelligence 
that might benefit Israel represents a hallmark underlying assumption of the intelligence 
community, the need-to-know principle.  Pollard stated that he “concluded that those 
restrictions were inappropriate for Israel,” and after the 1983 bombing of the United 
States Marine barracks in Beirut, he determined to “do something that would guarantee 
Israel’s security” (Blitzer 63).  Pollard later commented that he realized the illegality of 
his actions but allegedly determined “that the ends justified the means’” (Blitzer 63).  
Pollard’s election to provide classified information to Israel without authorization based 
on individual versus organizational values represents one contribution of organizational 
culture to security failures.  Another contributory factor, which is oftentimes an offshoot 
of motivation and value issues, is the influence of monetary gain on intelligence 
professionals. 
Prior to providing information to the Israelis, Pollard voluntarily disclosed 
classified information to investment associates who, along with their clients, might 
benefit economically from the intelligence Pollard shared.  According to Blitzer, 
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“Pollard told U.S. investigators that although he was not paid for the information, he 
hoped to be rewarded ultimately through business opportunities that these individuals 
could arrange for him when he left Naval Intelligence” (70).  Pollard’s admission that 
he sought financial gain from these disclosures is at odds with his later claims that he 
expected no remuneration from Israel for turning over classified documents.  Despite 
his willingness to provide Israel free access to classified information initially, Pollard 
claims Israel forced him to accept compensation for his actions.  Pollard stated that his 
handlers “would want him to like the extra cash, trips and presents” (Blitzer 79).  
Blitzer notes that the Israelis also wished for Pollard “to get used to a more comfortable 
lifestyle” (79).  One might argue that, comparatively, intelligence careers do not offer 
lucrative compensation structures so that only prospective employees who share the 
basic underlying assumptions of the culture will pursue a career in the intelligence field.  
The rationale for such logic of course is that employees who share said assumptions 
pose a lesser risk of compromising security than those employees who do not accept the 
cultural assumptions of intelligence.  Ironically, the lack of pay parity is actually a 
recurrent motivating factor in many espionage cases, including Pollard’s.   
Hired in 1979 as an intelligence research specialist, Pollard was, by 1985, quite 
accustomed to the improved lifestyle his espionage permitted.  He received $2,500 
monthly from Israel for his service (Blitzer 96).  Apart from Pollard’s ideological 
motives, the financial incentive alone was a threat to the public service motives that 
most government servants embody.  Pollard, too, realized the conflicting nature of his 
priorities.  At his sentencing, Pollard apologetically stated 
Unfortunately, what I failed to remember was that whenever a civil 
servant can no longer abide by the political constraints of the 
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administration in which he serves or for whom he serves, he really only 
has one obligation, both to himself and the nation, and that is to resign in 
order to maintain his personal and his civic responsibility.  (qtd. in 
Blitzer 252) 
 
Pollard’s case not only demonstrates the relevance of cultural assumptions and values, 
his actions also capture the importance of cultural artifacts such as physical and 
personnel security and peer reporting to the detection and prevention of security 
failures. 
 One of the most controversial artifacts of the intelligence culture is the use of 
polygraph technology in pre- and post-employment screening exercises.  While the 
validity and accuracy of the polygraph as an instrument of truthfulness remains 
controversial, most intelligence organizations rely on this artifact to detect and develop 
issues that may be material to an individual’s suitability for employment in the 
intelligence field.  In Pollard’s case, for example, information that surfaced during a 
pre-employment polygraph examination disqualified Pollard from employment 
consideration at the CIA.  Absent that examination, Pollard might have eventually 
acquired access to information that was potentially more damaging to the United 
States’s security interests than the intelligence he obtained through his ONI 
assignments.  His handlers also realized the threat that the polygraph posed to their 
operation, and “Pollard was told that if he were ever picked up for questioning, he 
should always delay for as long as possible any polygraph examinations” (Blitzer 95).   
Whereas the CIA and Israelis recognized the value of this tool, Naval 
intelligence apparently did not.  On January 3, 1985, Pollard completed a periodic 
reinvestigation for continued suitability clearance that did not include the use of 
polygraph technology that likely would have revealed his espionage activities.  Instead, 
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Pollard promised to abide by non-disclosure principles and signed a security agreement, 
another cultural artifact of the intelligence community.  Afterward, his clearance level 
allowed access to sensitive compartmented information, or SCI, which is a heightened 
Top Secret clearance level for exceptionally classified information (Blitzer 95).  The 
lack of the polygraph artifact ensured the continuation of Pollard’s unauthorized 
collection and distribution of classified information.  There were other cultural artifacts 
that, although they exist in the intelligence community to detect and deter security 
failures, were noticeably ineffective in the Pollard scenario.  Of particular notoriety 
were physical and personnel security shortcomings as well as inadequate peer reporting 
mechanisms. 
In 1981, Pollard assisted in establishing communications between the CIA and 
South African naval officials.  The South Africans provided the CIA with important 
information on the location and abilities of various Soviet warships (Blitzer 58).  Due in 
part to conflicts between the CIA and Naval Investigative Service, Pollard’s role in the 
communication channel began to unravel, and questions arose concerning the veracity 
of his relationship with the South Africans.  Of Pollard, a senior ONI official observed 
that “[i]t became obvious the guy [Pollard] had to be unstable” (qtd. in Blitzer 59).   The 
official also stated that Pollard “wasn’t on anybody else’s wavelength,” which is why 
“the system got nervous about him’” (qtd. in Blitzer 59).  The only consequence of his 
peers’ observations was the temporary suspension of Pollard’s credentials, which the 
Navy reinstated after a psychological assessment administered by a friend of Dr. Morris 
Pollard concluded Pollard was stable.  The Naval Investigative Service pursued no other 
investigation action on Pollard’s alleged relationship with South African officials, and 
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in June 1984 Pollard received a transfer to the ONI’s Anti-Terrorist Alert Center 
(ATAC).   
Pollard’s transfer to ATAC was not a reward for exemplary performance.  
Blitzer points out that when “a new unit like ATAC is created…they will very often ask 
those people who are considered troublemakers or nonproducers to make the switch” 
(Blitzer 66).  The supervisory process of transferring or promoting problem employees 
is an issue that will resurface in the Ames survey, and the transfer of Pollard to ATAC 
only increased the number of classified documents to which he would obtain access.  
The intelligence community’s personnel security procedures failed, and so would the 
supposed physical security measures at ATAC. 
Intelligence organizations, especially those with active counterintelligence 
components, generally perform at least random searches of employees as they enter and 
particularly as they leave work environments where classified information is available.  
Employees also traditionally gain entrance to structures that house classified 
information only after presentation and verification of proper identification.  Naval 
Intelligence, however, half-heartedly implemented appropriate security precautions and 
enforced no basic counterintelligence security measures.  Employees were not subject to 
searches, and officers did not monitor whether employees requested access to classified 
information that they (the employees) had no need to review based on their intelligence 
assignments.  After his assignment to ATAC, Pollard “discovered that he could easily 
smuggle files out of his office” (Blitzer 71).  In fact, at only his second meeting with 
Aviem Sella, his initial handler, Pollard delivered forty-eight classified intelligence 
publications and photographs that he removed from ATAC without notice (Blitzer 78).   
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Pollard would increase gradually the number of documents he smuggled, 
undetected, from the ATAC, and ultimately he “delivered literally suitcases full of 
classified documents that he had been collecting” (Blitzer 94).  Even then-Secretary of 
Defense Casper Weinberger, in a pre-sentencing memorandum to the court, noted that 
Pollard frequently acted as a courier of classified documents (Blitzer 223).  It was not 
until Pollard’s ATAC supervisor, Phillip Agee, suspected Pollard might be involved in 
espionage that qualified counterintelligence officers became involved in the 
investigation (Blitzer 228).  As inadequate as the physical security lapses were, 
however, other personnel security shortcomings also contributed to Pollard’s success at 
espionage. 
Pollard’s January 3, 1985, security review did not include a polygraph 
examination, and it apparently lacked a financial analysis component as well.  To 
increase the scope and effectiveness of periodic reinvestigations, the reviews should at a 
minimum include a review of a subject’s credit history and assets.  Review of these 
items is a basic fixture of personnel security investigations and should always occur in 
security investigations.  A cursory review of the Pollards’ credit history would have 
revealed that between November 1984 and November 1985 the Pollards made payments 
in excess of $20,000 to an American Express credit card (Blitzer 103). Transactions in 
these amounts would have been obvious alarms to security and counterintelligence 
officers and could have prompted an immediate investigation into Pollard’s unexplained 
affluence.  Finally, Pollard’s reluctance to complete background investigation forms in 
September 1985 triggered warning bells to Agee, Pollard’s superior, and the 
intelligence specialist’s failure to comply with basic personnel security requirements 
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initiated his undoing.  Agee’s suspicions and another co-worker’s observation of Pollard 
leaving the ATAC with Top Secret documents led to the espionage investigation of 
Jonathan Pollard.  Unfortunately, significant damage to the United States national 
security had already occurred by the time the Pollard investigation began.   
Another reason that Pollard was able to conduct espionage activities undetected 
for an extended period of time was the necessity of the intelligence community 
performing its functions in a secretive manner and the little-discussed effect this secrecy 
has on spousal relations.  This issue affects assumptions about the intelligence mission, 
and it also has a role in the application of cultural artifacts of an intelligence 
organization.  A common underlying assumption is that most assignments contain 
classified information and, in accordance with governmental non-disclosure 
agreements, technically prohibit employees from discussing their duties with their 
spouses (unless, of course, the spouse also has the requisite clearance access and need to 
know).  Individual values, however, frequently dictate otherwise.  That is, it is not 
uncommon for intelligence professionals to discuss with their spouses various work 
assignments and personal reflections on the value of those assignments. 
Pollard, for example, shared with his wife far more than details about official 
assignments; he also told her about his espionage plans to benefit Israel.  Blitzer notes 
that “Anne knew all about his actions from the very start” (Blitzer 85).  More troubling 
than Pollard’s disclosure to Anne Pollard of his intentions to provide classified 
information to unauthorized recipients was his collection of classified documents 
related to the People’s Republic of China (PRC).  Pollard turned over to his wife 
substantial intelligence data on the PRC to increase the likelihood of her securing a 
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public relations contract with Chinese embassy officials (Blitzer 103-04).  Both Pollards 
remained adamant that Anne Pollard never communicated the contents of these 
classified documents to Chinese officials, but she clearly had neither the clearance nor 
the need to know such information.  As did her husband, Anne Pollard would also 
quickly learn to enjoy the fruits of the illicit proceeds her husband received from Israel.  
Jonathan Pollard’s liberal information sharing and spousal awareness of unexplained 
income are other red flags that a more thorough periodic reinvestigation or 
counterintelligence review would have uncovered if conducted properly. 
The classified information that Pollard gave and sold to Israel during his career 
with Naval Intelligence may have compromised crucial intelligence sources and 
methods, and ironically his actions weakened relations between the United States and 
Israel.  Obviously, his espionage on behalf of Israel also had a disquieting effect on the 
United States’s relations with various Middle Eastern states as well.  Despite the 
negative consequences of Pollard’s activities on the United States’s intelligence 
abilities, there are positive results associated with those compromises.   
Predictably, the announcement of Pollard’s arrest on espionage charges 
prompted immediate calls for improved counterintelligence investigations of 
intelligence personnel.  Senator David Durenberger, former chairman of the Senate 
Select Committee on Intelligence, issued a statement claiming Pollard’s espionage 
“reinforces the need for immediate action on the numerous proposals for improvement 
in counterintelligence” (qtd. in Blitzer 185).  In purely reactionary fashion, following 
the Pollard affair there were also calls from Justice Department officials for stricter FBI 
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background checks of persons of Jewish ancestry whose positions necessitated access to 
classified information.   
Intelligence professionals and supervisory personnel should note that the Pollard 
espionage matter spotlighted several areas of concern for intelligence managers, 
security officers, and counterintelligence staff.  First, ethnic diversity in the intelligence 
community is a necessity for the diversity of values it makes available to the 
organization.  However, managers should be mindful that diverse values may not be 
welcome in homogenous work environments, and it is incumbent on supervisors to 
balance the need for ethnic and value diversity with monitoring of employees for 
behavior not consistent with the intelligence community’s basic underlying 
assumptions.  Second, intelligence managers, in concert with counterintelligence staff, 
must ensure that adequate physical and personnel security measures are in place to deter 
if not detect threats to operational security.  Such countermeasures include polygraph 
applications, heightened physical security precautions, and improved background 
investigations of intelligence employees and their spouses.  Third, intelligence agencies 
should implement better mechanisms for peer and spousal reporting of suspicious 
activities by intelligence employees.  Intelligence organizations should request greater 
flexibility for dealing with internal personnel issues such as poor performance.         
Agencies must be able to deal with problem employees without promoting the 
individual or merely transferring the person to another area within or without the 
organization.  Fourth, intelligence leadership must balance the needs of the agencies 
with the missions of the organizations and rights of individual employees.  Intelligence 
managers would do well to realize operational threats are omnipresent, but proper 
 64




AMES CASE STUDY 
 
On February 21, 1994, Aldrich Hazen Ames departed his suburban residence 
outside Washington, D.C., in Arlington, Virginia.  Ames’s commute that day was to be 
like no other.  Shortly after leaving his residence, FBI agents stopped Ames’s vehicle 
and arrested him on charges of conspiracy to commit espionage for Russia and its 
predecessor state, the former Soviet Union.  The arrest of Ames effectively ended one 
of the most devastating penetrations of the United States intelligence system by a 
foreign power.  The magnitude of Ames’s espionage activities and their impact on the 
United States’s intelligence sources, methods, and past assessments of Soviet abilities 
and weaknesses would not become known until months after his arrest.  Investigators 
did know by the time of his arrest that Ames provided the Soviets and then Russians 
with some of the CIA’s most classified intelligence, and the information he provided 
was directly responsible for the death or imprisonment of as many as thirty sources of 
the CIA and FBI. 
On April 28, 1994, Aldrich Ames and his wife, Rosario Ames, pled guilty to 
charges based on their espionage activities.  In exchange for their guilty pleas and 
promised cooperation with intelligence and law enforcement authorities, Aldrich Ames 
received a lifetime prison sentence, and his wife received a sentence of sixty-three 
months in prison (Senate Assessment 4).  Rosario Ames has completed her sentence, 
but Aldrich H. Ames, prisoner number 40087-083, is currently serving his sentence for 
life at the Allenwood federal penitentiary near White Deer, Pennsylvania. 
At the time of his arrest, Ames had been an employee of the CIA for 31 years, 
and he spent practically his entire career in the CIA’s clandestine Directorate of 
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Operations (DO).  The security classification of information to which he had access was 
routinely Top Secret/SCI, and it included the names and identities of United States 
agents and double agents abroad and within the United States.  Particularly devastating 
was the fact that Ames had immediate, unquestioned access to the information most 
desired by the Soviets and Russians.  Ames provided his handlers with damaging 
national security information for almost ten years, and a review of the Ames affair 
demonstrates that numerous organizational culture principles specific to the intelligence 
community contributed to this unprecedented security failure.  The most prominent 
organizational factors in the Pollard affair were also problems in the Ames case.  In 
addition to employee motivation issues and physical and personnel security 
requirements, the affair also included an extreme inadequacy of information-sharing 
protocols.  The depth of Ames’s espionage activities dictate a categorical approach to an 
assessment of culture’s impact on the Ames security failure.  An overview of his 
familial and educational background as well as career progression is also insightful. 
Aldrich “Rick” Ames’s introduction to the intelligence community mirrored 
Jonathan Pollard’s experiences.  Ames’s father, Carleton Ames, held a doctorate degree 
and began working for the CIA’s DO in 1952.  Carleton Ames and his family completed 
an overseas tour in Southeast Asia by 1955, and due in part to his alcohol abuse and 
poor performance ratings, Carleton Ames spent the remainder of his career at CIA 
headquarters (Senate Assessment 5).  Several years later, in 1960, Aldrich Ames would 
begin a CIA career that amazingly would mirror his father’s employment journey. 
Ames first worked for the CIA as a painter in 1960, and he later found 
employment as a clerk typist on a full-time basis.  Ames worked for the CIA as a 
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document analyst in the DO for the next several years while he pursued a bachelor’s 
degree in history at George Washington University.  Ames subsequently applied to the 
CIA’s Career Trainee Program and entered training for the clandestine service in 1967 
(Senate Assessment 6).  His first overseas assignment was in Ankara, Turkey, and 
supervisory appraisals of his performance “considered him unsuitable for field work 
and expressed the view that perhaps he should spend the remainder of his career at CIA 
headquarters in Langley” (Senate Assessment 7).   
Ames’s next assignment was, in fact, a headquarters rotation, which was 
followed by assignments in New York City.  Despite numerous security infractions that 
should have raised suitability concerns, Ames enjoyed enthusiastically positive 
performance appraisals from his supervisors during these assignments and ultimately 
received promotion(s) to a GS-14 pay grade.  Ames’s successes, however, would be 
short-lived, and his next assignment to Mexico City reinforced previous appraisals of 
Ames’s inability to function adequately in an overseas recruitment environment.  In 
fact, “Ames appeared stronger handling established sources rather than developing new 
ones” (Senate Assessment 9).  While assigned to Mexico City Ames began an 
extramarital affair with Maria de Rosario Casas Dupuy, a paid CIA source, and she 
afterwards relocated to join Ames, whose next assignment at CIA headquarters was as 
counterintelligence branch chief for Soviet operations in the DO. 
Ames’s headquarters assignment was in Soviet counterintelligence, and he also 
assisted a field office whose function was source development in the Washington, D.C., 
area.  Due to his counterintelligence duties, “Ames was in a position to gain access to 
all CIA operations involving Soviet intelligence officers worldwide” (Senate 
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Assessment 11).  In addition, “[h]is assignment also gave him access to all CIA plans 
and operations targeted against the KGB and GRU intelligence services” (Senate 
Assessment 11).  Ames served in this position until his voluntary transfer to Rome from 
1986 to 1989, and once again, Ames’s performance evaluations reflected negatively on 
his abilities.  Despite poor appraisals and a record of committing flagrant security 
violations, Ames returned to the DO’s Soviet Operations Division in 1989 and later was 
transferred to the Counterintelligence Center Analysis Group and Counternarcotics 
Center where he remained until his arrest in February 1994 (Senate Assessment 42-44).  
In each of his assignments Ames exhibited behavior inconsistent with intelligence 
organizations’ expectations of its employees.  He routinely violated security rules, 
placed himself in compromising situations, and he contradicted the basic assumptions of 
intelligence work as well as the values that shape its conduct. 
Unlike Jonathan Pollard, whose motivation to commit espionage supposedly did 
not include financial gain initially, Aldrich Ames’s only incentive to commit espionage 
was the possibility of monetary rewards.  Ames’s reasons for disclosing classified 
information to unauthorized sources were completely self-serving and fit Downs’s 
model of a careerist climber whose personal gain eclipses all other concerns (Thomas 
400).  Ames recalled that financial difficulties caused him first to consider espionage in 
late 1984 or early 1985.  Ames had personal debts from his recent divorce settlement, a 
car loan, a signature loan, credit card payments, and other expenses associated with 
Rosario’s arrival in the United States.  Ames stated that “[i]t was these 
pressures…which in April 1985, led him [Ames] to conceive of ‘a scam to get money 
from the KGB’” (Senate Assessment 14).  Ames’s espionage activities might have been 
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prevented, however, had intelligence artifacts such as personnel security measures, peer 
reporting mechanisms, and supervisory oversight been more proactive. 
 Certain behaviors weaken employee credibility and suitability at a minimum and 
jeopardize intelligence operations at the other extreme.  Ames’s career is replete with 
security infractions that should be outright intolerable in the intelligence community.  
While assigned to New York, Ames left a briefcase full of classified information on a 
subway train, and he also received a citation for not securing various Top Secret 
communications equipment.  Neither action resulted in any reprimand or corrective 
action.  He also brought Rosario to a secure apartment in New York provided by the 
CIA and occasionally used his personal computer to prepare classified documents (CIA 
OIG Abstract 19).  Ames also reportedly removed from CIA headquarters plastic bags 
containing “five to seven pounds” of classified information (CIA OIG Abstract 20).  
While in Mexico, Ames had at least three extramarital affairs that he did not report, and 
neither he nor his coworkers reported his involvement with Rosario Dupuy, a foreign 
national known to be on the CIA’s payroll (CIA OIG Abstract 20).  The DO tendency to 
protect its own prevailed.  Other peers of Ames stated that Ames “frequently showed 
interest in areas unrelated to his immediate area of responsibility” (Senate Assessment 
28).  However, “none of those colleagues ever made this a matter for the record” 
(Senate Assessment 28).  In one glaring example of failed peer reporting requirements, 
the following information surfaced regarding Ames’s contact with Soviet officials: 
One of Ames’s subordinates in Rome told the FBI after Ames’s arrest 
that she had suspected Ames was not fully documenting the relationship 
between himself and the Soviet official.  In fact, she had searched the 
office data base to see whether Ames was reporting all of his contacts.  
Although she concluded that he was not, she did not notify any senior 
manager.  (Senate Assessment 29) 
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All of Ames’s security violations belied the basic assumptions that form the foundation 
of an intelligence organization’s culture, and organizational artifacts that could have 
decreased the severity of the Ames affair were noticeably absent. 
 During his Mexico assignment, Ames also began to abuse alcohol.  His problem 
drinking resulted in recommendations that he receive treatment for alcohol abuse upon 
return to headquarters.  Ames “had one counseling session but there was no follow up 
program of treatment” (Senate Assessment 10).  Several Agency personnel who 
supervised Ames did not report his behavior because “alcohol abuse was not uncommon 
in the DO during the mid- to late-1980s,” and other managers pointed to a lack of 
support from Langley in dealing with employees who represented problems or threats to 
CIA objectives (CIA OIG Abstract 20-21).  The DO’s protective posture reinforced this 
trend.  One report concluded that a DO officer “who has been through training, gone 
through the polygraph examination, and had an overseas assignment, is accepted as a 
‘member of the club,’ whose fitness for assignments, promotions, and continued service 
becomes immune from challenge” (Senate Assessment 70).  
Reminiscent of Pollard’s transfer to the ATAC as a managerial means of dealing 
with someone whom supervisors considered a problem employee, CIA headquarters 
personnel adopted similar procedures to deal with Ames.  Ames’s transfer to Rome 
from Langley reportedly “was seen as a good way to move a weak performer out of 
headquarters”  (Senate Assessment 27).  Ames’s alcohol abuse was only one of several 
personnel security issues that peers and supervisors should have reported for proper 
application of artifacts of the intelligence culture.  Ames’s unexplained wealth, 
spending habits, foreign travel, and acquisitions, for example, were certainly not in line 
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with most other intelligence professionals’ abilities and should have alerted 
counterintelligence officers also. 
 Ames’s supervisors noted that he received frequent counseling for failure to 
submit timely reports and financial accountings of operational fund disbursements (CIA 
OIG Abstract 18-19).  These failures complemented Ames’s existing reputation for 
administrative weakness as evidenced by appraisals that noted his “tendency to 
procrastinate, particularly in terms of his late submissions of his financial accountings 
and operational contact reports” (Senate Assessment 8).  Ames’s operational finances, 
however, were only a smaller part of a much larger financial problem.  His personal 
finances were a model case study in the undue affluence counterintelligence officers 
should look for when conducting periodic reinvestigations or security inquiries. 
 Ames received his first payment from the Soviets on May 17, 1985.  According 
to Ames, the initial $50,000 that he received was to be a “one time deal” (Senate 
Assessment 16).  It was not a one time deal, however, as Ames received approximately 
$2.5 million for the information he sold, and the proceeds he derived from this conduct 
allowed considerable purchase power.  While receiving an annual salary of less than 
$70,000, Ames managed to purchase new Jaguar automobiles and a home—for which 
he paid cash—valued at $540,000 (Senate Assessment 2).  Ames explained his 
newfound wealth by claiming that Rosario Ames’s wealthy family had provided 
financial assistance to the couple.  However, more extensive investigations would have 
revealed the deception behind Ames’s explanations (CIA OIG Abstract 22-23).  
Additionally, proper application of polygraph technology also would have limited the 
security compromises Ames committed. 
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 Prior to departing for Rome in 1986, Ames learned that he would have to 
complete a polygraph examination before his European assignment began.  Ames later 
revealed that he “might not have made the decision to commit espionage in April of 
1985 if he had known that he was going to be polygraphed the next year” (Senate 
Assessment 26).  After Ames’s arrest, the FBI review of Ames’s polygraph results 
revealed unresolved questions about Ames’s apparently deceptive responses to 
counterintelligence questioning.  The FBI determined that had the CIA polygraphers did 
not apply the instrument properly and should have developed more detailed questioning 
based on Ames’s responses to initial questions (CIA OIG Abstract 26-27).  The 1986 
examination was not Ames’s only polygraph experience. 
In 1991 Ames again underwent a background investigation (including financial 
review) and polygraph testing.  Although the background investigation and financial 
scrutiny raised questions about Ames’s suitability for access to classified information, 
the polygraph examiners who conducted the 1991 examination did not receive those 
investigative results before they conducted the polygraph tests.  The examiners noted 
that “having such detailed information available could have significantly altered their 
approach to testing Ames” (CIA OIG Abstract 27).  Better information sharing could 
have improved the quality of the polygraph examination and may have detected Ames’s 
activities sooner.  This miscommunication is merely a minor snapshot of the problems 
inherent in the intelligence community’s guarded information sharing and the effect that 
such mutations of the assumption have on operational security. 
 Former Inspector General Hitz succinctly summarizes the impact of the 
information sharing assumption when he argues that “the major failing in the Ames case 
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appears to be traceable to non-coordination and non-sharing of derogatory information 
concerning Ames” (Hitz 26).  In addition, “Hitz elaborated on this by concluding that 
the Ames case resulted from ‘ambiguous divisions of responsibility,’ ‘breakdown in 
communication,’ and an ‘absence of collaboration and sharing of information’” (qtd. in 
Turner 260).  Hitz’s reference is to both the CIA’s internal compartmentation structure 
that prevented information sharing across divisions, and the Agency’s unwillingness to 
share information with its FBI counterparts who have the responsibility for domestic 
espionage investigations.   
As early as 1986 the CIA had established an investigative group to determine 
the reason(s) for various source and operation compromises:   
The CIA IG report indicates that the investigation group was hesitant to 
solicit financial expertise from other components within CIA, such as the 
Office of Financial Management or the IG Audit Staff, and that they 
were even more wary of seeking help from any outside sources such as 
the FBI.  They felt that people outside of the Directorate of Operations 
would not have the proper sensitivities to the DO Culture or to the fact 
that CIA employees were under scrutiny.  (Senate Assessment 53) 
 
Finally, in mid-1991, the joint CIA/FBI investigation of the compromises began as the 
Special Investigations Unit (SIU).  The group included two CIA counterintelligence 
experts, an FBI agent, and an FBI analyst (DOJ OIG Review C).  While the CIA 
leadership suspected as early as 1986 that a CIA officer might be responsible for the 
significant security compromises the Agency suffered, the CIA did not formally advise 
the FBI of the specific case details until 1993.  In fact, even after the creation of the 
SIU, “FBI members of the SIU were given full access to the information that had been 
developed concerning Ames…[t]hey had almost no involvement in the investigation of 
Ames” (DOJ OIG Review C).  The CIA initially dismissed the possibility of an Agency 
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penetration being responsible for the compromises, and the intelligence : law 
enforcement ideological differences referenced earlier prohibited the free exchange of 
information that would have identified Ames as the CIA mole years in advance of 1991 
when Ames appeared as one of twenty-nine employees suspected of compromising 
Agency operations.   
The trend of managerial inattentiveness to substandard performance, undesirable 
behavioral patterns, and the security threats associated with these issues are recurrent 
themes in the intelligence organization culture.  As noted by former Inspector General 
Hitz’s report on the Ames affair, 
Although information regarding Ames’s professional and personal 
failings may not have been available in the aggregate to all of his 
managers or in any complete and official record, little effort was made 
by those managers who were aware of Ames’s poor performance and 
behavioral problems to identify the problems officially and deal with 
them. If Agency management had acted more responsibly and 
responsively as these problems arose, it is possible that the Ames case 
could have been avoided in that he might not have been placed in a 
position where he could give away such sensitive source information.  
(CIA OIG Abstract 11) 
 
Supervisory assumptions trumped organizational assumptions in the context of the 
Ames case.  The Agency’s most critical shortcomings were in its system of artifacts, as 
they were unable to address the threat posed by a disgruntled employee with a rapidly-
declining value system whose environment lacked adequate operational safeguards.  
The CIA’s hesitance to share information with law enforcement represents a mutation 
of a core underlying assumption of the intelligence culture and is largely to blame for 
the massive security failure. 
 Despite the obvious negative results of Ames’s espionage activities, one positive 
consequence was that the intelligence community and its leadership identified numerous 
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areas for improvement and implemented several programs to improve organizational 
efficiency and minimize the risk of security breaches.  On May 3, 1994, former 
President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 44.  The 
counterintelligence directive’s intent was “to foster increased cooperation, coordination 
and accountability among all US counterintelligence agencies” (White House “U.S. 
Counterintelligence Effectiveness”).  PDD 44 also created the National 
Counterintelligence Center as an information clearinghouse and requires improved 
information exchanges between FBI and CIA managers to achieve better law 
enforcement : intelligence coordination (White House “U.S. Counterintelligence 
Effectiveness”).  The directive reinforces the existing requirements for information 
sharing originally specified in Executive Order 12333 and a 1988 memorandum of 
understanding between the FBI and CIA.  To facilitate improved information exchange, 
the directive “placed a senior FBI official in charge of counterespionage inside CIA 
headquarters” (Kitfield “Anti-terror”).  Such a placement and cooperation would not 
have occurred prior to Ames’s arrest. 
 In the aftermath of the Ames case, Justice Department and Agency officials 
have cited increased levels of cooperation for the identification and neutralization of 
other security threats such as those posed by Harold Nicholson, the former CIA station 
chief in Romania.  The FBI arrested Nicholson on November 16, 1996, for violating 
Title XVIII, section 794, or committing espionage and conspiracy to commit espionage 
on behalf of Russia (CIA Joint Press Release).  Whereas the Ames affair revealed 
startling miscommunications within and outside the CIA about Ames’s polygraph 
results and background investigations, in the Nicholson case, “the deception and 
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Nicholson’s behavior immediately triggered a counterintelligence investigation, and the 
FBI was informed up front about a potential spy case” (Hulnick 280).  In a press release 
issued by the CIA after Nicholson’s arrest, then-Director of Central Intelligence John 
Deutch observed: 
The arrest of Nicholson is the direct result of an unprecedented level of 
cooperation between the CIA and the FBI.  We are now able to 
demonstrate quite conclusively that the post-Ames reforms worked as 
designed.  Clearly the post-Ames analysis and detection mechanisms the 
CIA and FBI put in place succeeded in the identification of Nicholson 
and his alleged espionage activities on behalf of the Russian intelligence 
service.  (CIA Joint Press Release) 
 
Commenting on Nicholson’s arrest on espionage charges, former FBI director Louis 
Freeh echoed DCI Deutch and stated that the “most formidable weapon against this 
grave crime is a close partnership between the FBI and the CIA” (CIA Joint Press 
Release).  The leaders’ statements reflect their attempts to reconcile conflicting 
ideologies and cultural assumptions applicable to the entire intelligence community. 
 Improved FBI : CIA cooperation is largely attributable to the efforts of senior 
Agency and Bureau officials known as the “Gang of Eight” (Hulnick 282).  These 
senior leaders have recognized the need to establish firewalls between law enforcement 
and intelligence so that communication between them does not jeopardize sources, 
methods, or other operational concerns specific to each agency.  The CIA’s lead 
representative to the Gang of Eight meetings was then-Deputy Director George Tenet.  
Addressing the importance of this group and its efforts, DCI Tenet commented 
I think the Ames case was the jumping off point in taking cooperation 
between the FBI and CIA seriously, because it proved that we could no 
longer tolerate petty bureaucratic jealousy and turf wars in dealing with 
threats to American security.  And from the very beginning, we 
consciously sought to institutionalize the reforms at all working levels so 
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that they would become steeped in our culture and not dependent on 
transient personalities.  (qtd. in Kitfield 2868) 
 
 In observance of the necessity to bridge the gaps in intelligence and law 
enforcement cooperation without ruffling existing cultural assumptions or ideologies, 
Congress passed the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1996.  The Act permits the FBI 
“to task both the CIA and NSA to gather intelligence against targets related to FBI 
cases” (Hulnick 275).  This statutory requirement imposes stricter standards on both 
intelligence and law enforcement and likely will result in improved threat assessments, 
criminal prosecutions, and, optimistically, prevention of grand-scale security failures 
and terrorist attacks.  The intelligence : law enforcement divide is primarily ideological; 
they share numerous cultural assumptions and should strive to prevent exaggerations of 
assumptions and employ cultural artifacts in a manner consistent with organizational 
requirements for security.  Successful applications of these principles resulted in the 
arrest of Harold Nicholson, and they were also instrumental in the detection of FBI 




HANSSEN CASE STUDY 
 
 On February 18, 2001, agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation armed with 
a search warrant and an arrest warrant arrived at a park outside Vienna, Virginia.  
Agents had previously drafted an affidavit in support of the arrest of an individual 
believed to have committed espionage against the United States.  The investigators also 
had permission to search a single-family residence located at 9414 Talisman Drive, 
Vienna, Virginia.  FBI agents sought to search the premises and arrest an occupant of 
the Vienna residence for violations of Title XVIII United States Code, Sections 794 (a) 
and 794 (c).  Specifically, the warrant for arrest alleged that its subject had transmitted 
national defense information without authorization and conspired to commit espionage 
against the United States (FBI Affidavit par. 4).  National security investigations and 
arrests for criminal conduct associated with such affairs are everyday occurrences for 
the FBI since that agency has primary enforcement authority for those alleged crimes.  
It is not common, however, for the FBI to arrest one of its own.  On February 18, 
however, FBI agents arrested special agent Robert Philip Hanssen, a twenty-five year 
veteran of the FBI, for committing espionage on behalf of the Soviet Union and Russia 
since 1985. 
 Hanssen’s arrest sent shock waves throughout the law enforcement and 
intelligence community.  Counterintelligence officials were especially startled by the 
revelations that Hanssen, a seasoned FBI agent with extensive experience in 
counterintelligence operations, had allegedly been on the Soviet and Russian payrolls 
since 1985.  Later confirmation of these allegations confirmed that Hanssen had been a 
Soviet spy for fifteen of his twenty-five years as an FBI agent, and Hanssen’s defense 
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attorney later announced that Hanssen began spying as early as 1979 (“Hanssen”).  The 
consequences of Hanssen’s actions were devastating to intelligence and law 
enforcement agencies whose missions involved the collection, analysis, and 
investigation of national security information and suspected compromises thereof.  The 
enormity of the damage to national security caused by Hanssen’s compromises would 
not be known until CIA and FBI personnel debriefed Hanssen following his guilty 
pleas. 
 On June 14, 2001, the Department of Justice submitted for legal consideration a 
plea agreement between the United States and Robert Philip Hanssen.  The plea 
agreement Hanssen entered into with the government acknowledged Hanssen 
committed “13 counts of substantive acts of espionage and one count of attempted 
espionage” on behalf of foreign powers, namely the former Soviet Union and Russian 
Federation (DOJ “Hanssen”).  The agreement also required Hanssen’s unfettered 
cooperation with law enforcement and intelligence officials so they may “assess the full 
scope and consequences of Hanssen’s espionage activity, and the damage he has caused 
his country” (DOJ “Hanssen”).  By pleading guilty, Hanssen avoided a possible death 
sentence for his crimes but is ineligible for parole.  
Like Pollard and Ames, whose childhood and adolescent exposure to the 
intelligence field influenced their career choices, Robert Philip Hanssen’s father was a 
veteran lieutenant for the Chicago Police Department in Chicago, Illinois.  Hanssen’s 
familiarity with the law enforcement community undoubtedly influenced his decision to 
pursue a career in law enforcement.  Like Pollard and Ames, Hanssen acknowledged an 
early interest in intelligence issues.  On or about March 14, 2000, Hanssen (also known 
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as “B” to his Russian handlers), prepared a letter in which he stated, “I decided on this 
course when I was 14 years old” (FBI Affidavit par. 130).  For Hanssen, however, the 
motivation to commit espionage was not a straightforward financial reason as it was for 
Ames.  Like Pollard, Hanssen’s motives for his actions were mixed, and the FBI agent’s 
education, training, and career progression influenced his values and motivation for 
committing espionage.  These factors also enabled Hanssen to remain undetected for 
fifteen years. 
Hanssen received an AB degree in chemistry from Knox College in 1966.  After 
studying dentistry for approximately two years, Hanssen earned an MBA in accounting 
and information systems from Northwestern University in 1971.  He became a certified 
public accountant (CPA) in 1973 after working for two years as a junior accountant.  
Prior to passing the CPA examination Hanssen entered on duty as an investigator with 
the Financial Section of the Chicago Police Department’s Inspection Services Division 
(FBI Affidavit par. 23-24).  In January 1976 Hanssen began his career as a special agent 
with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, a position he retained until his arrest in 
February 2001. 
Upon completion of his initial FBI training, Hanssen worked on a white-collar 
crime squad in Gary, Indiana until 1978.  He then transferred to the FBI field office in 
New York, New York, and his assignments concentrated on criminal accounting 
practices and investigations.   Beginning in March 1979, Hanssen assisted with the New 
York Field Office’s development of an automated counterintelligence database and 
obtained access to information on intelligence officers and other foreign officials 
assigned to the United States (FBI Affidavit par. 26-29).  From 1981 to 1985 Hanssen 
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served as a supervisor in the Intelligence Division of FBI headquarters.  He also worked 
in the FBI’s Budget Unit and obtained access to detailed information on FBI sources 
and counterintelligence activities.  Between 1983 and 1985 Hanssen worked in the 
Bureau’s Soviet Analytical Unit and Foreign Counterintelligence (FCI) Technical 
Committee (FBI Affidavit par. 30).  Hanssen enjoyed frequent assignments in 
Washington, D.C., and New York, New York, where his duties focused primarily on 
Soviet intelligence and counterintelligence operations.  He also spent six years as a 
senior FBI counterintelligence representative at the Department of State.  Hanssen’s 
numerous assignments in the Bureau’s intelligence and operations divisions 
necessitated ongoing training in counterintelligence tradecraft.  While the specific 
training Hanssen received is classified, it is common knowledge that the instruction he 
received better prepared him for the rigors of espionage. 
By all accounts, Hanssen’s counterintelligence and information systems training 
prevented earlier detection of his involvement with the Soviets and Russians.  He also 
was cautious not to exhibit behavior that might alert his peers, superiors, or 
counterintelligence officers to his actions.  During the periods where Hanssen spied for 
foreign governments and received substantial payments for the information he supplied, 
Lawrence Walsh notes that he “displayed no signs of extravagance…maintained his 
purist, church-going lifestyle…exhibited exemplary diligence in his professional duties, 
ingratiating himself to his superiors” (Walsh n.p.)   Pollard and Ames became careless 
about their activities, but Hanssen was cautious not to attract attention to himself and 
proactively sought to discourage suspicions that he might be a spy.  Whereas Pollard 
and Ames allowed financial gain to corrupt them, Hanssen’s self-proclaimed motives 
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for espionage were not financial.  As former DCI James Woolsey noted, his 
“personality and his arrogance had something to do with his decision” to commit 
espionage (Woolsey n.p.).  Hanssen committed espionage to pacify his ego, and that 
motivation creates difficulties for investigators because value-based threats are less 
apparent and more complex to detect than other (i.e., financial) incentives to commit 
espionage.  
Despite Hanssen’s exemplary performance in all of his FBI assignments, he did 
not receive appointments to senior positions.  Although he was proficient in his duties 
and regarded well by supervisors, Walsh notes that Hanssen “was passed over several 
times for command positions, instead being placed on desk jobs” (Walsh n.p.).  He 
notes that Hanssen’s failure to receive promotions made him (Hanssen) feel indignant 
(Walsh n.p.).  Walsh also references one commentator who noted that “Hanssen 
betrayed his country to feed a more basic need:  to pump up his ego” (qtd. in Walsh 
n.p.).   Former FBI profiler Bill Tafoya observed that “[w]hen we sense that somebody 
is not appreciating us, someone is either ignoring or, worse, criticizing us, our self-
worth is challenged” (qtd. in Walsh n.p.). 
Tafoya also suggests that Hanssen and other “ego-driven insiders are motivated 
more by the trophies they collect for themselves than the acknowledgement of others….  
As long as he remained one step ahead of internal security, Hanssen could bask in the 
self-knowledge that he was better than so-called superiors” (qtd. in Walsh n.p.).   
According to Walsh, what made Hanssen more dangerous than others is that he 
“cultivated the trust of his superiors…internalized his frustration and directed his skills 
and knowledge to a nefarious pursuit” (Walsh n.p.).  By remaining below the 
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counterintelligence radar, Hanssen avoided cultural artifacts inherent in the intelligence 
community.  His actions also undercut basic assumptions about intelligence by 
satisfying his own individual value needs. 
  One of the flawed basic assumptions in intelligence organizations that Hanssen 
leveraged to his advantage is the errant belief that personnel who occupy senior 
intelligence positions are immune from the influence(s) of espionage.  Individuals with 
considerable experience and training are perceived frequently as lesser threats than 
agents or field operatives who have routine access to other states’ intelligence 
representatives.  The high level of trust imparted to senior professionals is necessary in 
the intelligence community, but the assumption that employee value systems are always 
consistent with the organizations’ values is unrealistic.  Consider, for example, the 
extent to which Hanssen abused this assumption in furtherance of his crimes. 
 Hanssen’s placement in senior level FBI positions necessitated access to highly 
compartmented information.  There was a blanket assumption that, based on his duties 
and responsibilities, Hanssen’s need to know classified information was unquestionable.  
He routinely accessed the FBI’s computer systems to determine whether he was “the 
subject of FBI investigative interest, including checking FBI records to determine 
whether there have been recent entries as to his own name, his home address, or the 
signal site” Hanssen used to communicate with his handlers (FBI Affidavit par. 5f).   
 Another impediment to operational security that is traceable to a flaw in the 
basic underlying assumptions in the intelligence community is the tendency for 
individuals who amass significant experience in a given subject area to be considered 
indispensable to a specific function.  Persons considered to possess special skills are 
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less likely to rotate out of positions where their continued exposure to certain 
intelligence increases the risk that the information could be compromised.  Frequent 
reassignments and rotations of key personnel prevent extensive exposure to classified 
information and represent another cultural artifact that, when implemented, may 
forestall security failures.  Better application of this cultural artifact, in conjunction with 
improved polygraph testing, is important to improving operational security. 
 Unlike the CIA and other intelligence organizations, the FBI has not required 
polygraph examinations of agents during periodic background reinvestigations.  The 
Bureau utilizes the polygraph as a pre-employment screening tool, but its post-
employment application has been limited historically to the examination of sources of 
information and suspects.  The noticeable absence of the polygraph within the FBI as a 
deterrent to espionage or any other crime for its agents is a critical cultural shortcoming 
that is inconsistent with an assumption that intelligence professionals maintain the 
highest degree of integrity and honesty.  In the Pollard case and Ames affair, despite 
concerns over its accuracy and legitimacy, the possibility of polygraph examination 
represented a significant threat to continued espionage activities.  Although Ames’s 
espionage efforts continued after he underwent polygraph testing, better administration 
of the exam and improved information sharing about his results could have revealed his 
actions much earlier.  The application of polygraph technology in Hanssen’s case could 
have minimized the damage he caused also.   
 Fortunately, once the Bureau determined the existence of a security breach 
within its ranks, the FBI’s investigation of Hanssen did not suffer from interagency turf 
battles common in task forces formed to investigate serious crimes.  Intelligence and 
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law enforcement cooperation were much improved in this case than relations had been 
during the Ames affair.  At the time of Hanssen’s arrest, Louis Freeh was the director of 
the FBI. 
Freeh said the investigation that led to the charges is a direct result of the 
combined and continuing FBI/CIA effort ongoing for many years to 
identify additional foreign penetrations of the U.S. intelligence 
community.  The investigation of Hanssen was conducted by the FBI 
with direct assistance from the CIA, Department of State and the Justice 
Department, and represents an aggressive and creative effort which led 
to this counterintelligence success.  (FBI Statement) 
 
There is also no evidence that supervisory complacency contributed to Hanssen’s 
continued criminal activity.  Hanssen did not receive promotions as a means of dealing 
with an agent his supervisors considered eccentric.  Once the investigation into 
Hanssen’s espionage began, investigators reconstructed Hanssen’s assignments and 
contacts he had in each of his assignments.  Despite Hanssen’s attempt to conceal large 
monetary payments from his handlers, FBI agents conducted thorough financial reviews 
that determined Hanssen received over $1.4 million in cash and diamonds from his 
espionage sponsors.  Although Hanssen utilized extensive counterintelligence skills to 
elude suspicion, it appears from the evidence gathered that FBI agents appropriately 
employed various cultural artifacts to reduce the risk Hanssen posed.   
The Bureau’s physical security measures such as personal and electronic 
surveillance allowed the agency to monitor Hanssen’s travels and communications with 
the Soviets and Russians.  The technical security options they exercised included 
electronic and other monitoring of Hanssen’s access to automated information that 
could have disclosed the Bureau’s suspicions of him.  Unfortunately, the Bureau only 
instituted such screening tools after it began the Hanssen investigation.  The FBI also 
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recognized that Hanssen’s counterintelligence experience and access to classified 
information were unnecessary risks and modified his responsibilities without alerting 
him to the agency’s investigation.  The FBI’s application of the aforementioned cultural 
artifacts demonstrates succinctly the impact that proper and timely application of the 
principles can have on security compromises. 
The investigation of Robert Philip Hanssen’s espionage activities and his arrest 
for those crimes also indicate that despite their ideological differences, it is possible for 
law enforcement agencies with shared cultural assumptions, values, and artifacts to 
cooperate and supplement each other’s intelligence and enforcement functions.  
Hanssen’s guilty plea is a testament to the success of that improved coordination.  The 
Hanssen case clearly illustrates the constructive attributes of positive cultural 
assumptions such as information sharing principles, and it also highlights the threat that 
individual values pose to operational security.  The review of Hanssen’s activities also 
imparts the importance of cultural artifacts to agencies’ continued ability to identify 
those persons and institutions that represent the greatest danger to the United States’s 
national security interests.  Although the Hanssen study undoubtedly exhibits positive 
results of effective organizational culture icons of the intelligence community, there 
remains considerable room for improvement to the organizational culture of the United 
States intelligence establishment.  Intelligence professionals and managers would do 
well to give due consideration to the observations that follow. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The organizational culture of the intelligence community is unique from that of 
other governmental institutions and notably dissimilar from most private sector 
enterprises.  Despite some ideological differences between intelligence agencies and 
law enforcement organizations, they do share numerous cultural assumptions, values, 
and artifacts.  The cultural elements that intelligence and law enforcement share are 
certainly responsible for many of the security weaknesses and failures that have beset 
the intelligence (and to a lesser extent) law enforcement community.  The case studies 
of Jonathan Pollard, Aldrich Ames, and Robert Hanssen demonstrate that these cultural 
attributes are present in the defense, intelligence, and law enforcement organizations 
that have intelligence collection and analysis functions.  This study also concludes that 
cultural factors sometimes affect negatively operational security whether the cultural 
elements are active (i.e., assumptions) or absent (i.e., artifacts).  The forces that threaten 
the intelligence culture’s basic underlying assumptions are individual values, and 
organizational abilities to address this threat are extraordinarily dependent on the 
intelligence community’s artifacts. 
 How, then, may intelligence organizations protect themselves from the threats 
that individual values systems pose to security?  Walsh questions, “How do you prevent 
another Robert Hanssen from being cultivated by a foreign power?” (Walsh n.p.).  He 
accurately answers that “[i]n a democratic society, the simple answer is you 
can’t….[l]oose controls create a greater probability of exploitation, while extremely 
tight security alienates the people you want to trust” (Walsh n.p.).  Threats to the United 
States intelligence infrastructure are omnipresent.  Despite the most efficient application 
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of proactive counterintelligence measures, there will always be some degree of 
incompatibility between organizational assumptions and the values of those that 
comprise the group.  What exacerbates this problem in the intelligence community is 
the fact that the employee training necessary to conduct intelligence responsibilities also 
has the unintended consequence of equipping the potential spy with skills that make 
detection of such efforts more difficult.  Intelligence professionals and managers can 
only ensure that they recognize the risk posed by the nature of their operations and 
assets (human as well as non-human).  They must also adopt proactive problem-solving 
approaches that deter deviation from established value systems, and they must install 
countermeasures that detect security weaknesses or failures.  This process begins with a 
re-examination of the most basic assumptions of the intelligence community. 
 The reliability of the intelligence community is dependent on the integrity of its  
employees.  One assumption about the intelligence profession is that those who pursue 
it as a career have only the noblest of intentions and will respect the secrecy 
requirement that is also assumed applicable at all times.  Another accepted necessity is 
the need to limit information access through imposition of need-to-know principles and 
extensive compartmentation.  Information sharing is extremely limited, yet the lack of 
adequate communication within and among agencies may also have unintended, 
negative consequences.  Related to these processes are understandings that 
organizations will employ cultural artifacts in support of these assumptions.  It is also 
understood that intelligence organizations must conduct some affairs clandestinely in 
order to obtain the information necessary for analysis and subsequent use by policy 
makers to make national security decisions.  Unfortunately, a corollary assumption of 
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the intelligence community from without more so than within is that intelligence 
organizations disrespect civil liberties, moral standards, and ethical norms in 
furtherance of goals that are not necessarily consistent with the idealism that the 
organizations represent.  These assumptions about the United States intelligence 
community must contend with individual values that challenge their validity. 
 The intelligence community depends on the diversity of values its employees 
represent.  While ethnic diversity issues are not central to the espionage cases of 
Pollard, Ames, and Hanssen, the intelligence community would do well to stress ethnic 
diversity in its recruitment efforts to prevent mirror-imaging tendencies and improve the 
intelligence product the community creates.  As Callum points out, ethnic diversity may 
present challenges to cultural assumptions, but homogeneity “will only perpetuate the 
mistakes of the past and create the failures of the future” (Callum 39).  Callum also 
notes that “[t]he most fundamental way of improving intelligence is to establish the 
heterogeneity” of the intelligence community (Callum 39).  Intelligence agencies should 
seek ethnic diversity without the use of recruitment quota systems that sacrifice quality 
standards in favor of quantity requirements.   
 Employee motivations lie at the heart of value conflicts with organizational 
assumptions.  Intelligence agencies should attempt to create environments in which 
intelligence professionals may achieve self-actualization through satisfaction of 
monetary needs as well as fulfillment of higher level social and ideological 
requirements.  Policy makers, in consultation with intelligence leaders and human 
resource managers, should ensure compensation parity exists between civil servants and 
the private sector.  Intelligence executives should also ensure all personnel, especially 
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managers, receive more training and instruction in leadership skills.  The United States 
Commission on Roles of the Intelligence Community argued that “[t]raining should be 
treated as a continuous part of career development at all levels and should be used to 
inculcate goals and values as well as develop management skills” (United States 
Commission).  Agencies must also monitor closely employee exposure to classified 
information and regularly rotate intelligence staffers to minimize security vulnerabilities 
created by extended assignments to sensitive positions. 
 Intelligence agencies’ stress on the importance of loyalty and integrity as 
personal attributes oftentimes prevent employees from reporting the suspicious behavior 
of peers.  Organizations must encourage employees to report behavior that appears to 
dissent from standards expected of intelligence professionals.  Intelligence managers 
have a corresponding duty to act on those reports and not address the complaint by 
recommending the transfer or promotion of potential problem employees.  In the most 
severe cases, intelligence organizations should have greater flexibility to terminate 
employees whose behavior or poor performance increases their vulnerability to 
manipulation by other intelligence services.  Agencies must also be cautious, however, 
to ensure such personnel removals are justifiable, as employee retribution for 
unwarranted dismissals may also affect security concerns negatively.  Organizations 
should also encourage employee reporting to Office of Inspector General (OIG) staff 
when concerns over supervisory inattentiveness are material.  The OIG, in turn, must 
have the authority to report directly to the executive and legislative officials any matters 
that the OIG believes are best addressed above the organizational level. 
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 In recognition of the security risks that individual values represent to 
organizational assumptions, intelligence agencies must develop and implement cultural 
artifacts to enable appropriate systems of checks and balances that the intelligence 
mission demands.  Among the artifacts to be strengthened are thorough periodic 
reinvestigations that include detailed financial analyses and interview of coworkers, 
peers, spouses, and acquaintances.  Intelligence agencies should also improve physical 
security mechanisms to include random searches of employees and their work areas and 
surveillance of areas where classified information is received and analyzed.  
Counterintelligence and information technology experts should also remove from 
computer equipment any medium that allows the transfer of information from the 
computer to an external device (i.e., diskettes or digital discs, ethernet cards, magnetic 
drives, etc.). 
 Intelligence organizations should also emphasize the use of polygraph 
examinations as a counterintelligence tool.  Polygraph examiners should work in 
concert with background investigators to ensure that derogatory information obtained in 
either process is made available to the other party.  In his Senate Judiciary Committee 
testimony, former CIA counsel Jeffrey Smith points out that the polygraph remains 
“only one tool in an effective counterintelligence program” despite concerns over its 
reliability (Smith n.p.).  As pointed out by Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman 
Richard Shelby, polygraph examinations will not “stop everything such as spying, 
espionage, but it will thwart a lot of it” by virtue of its deterrent effects (Shelby n.p.). 
 In the aftermath of numerous espionage cases, including those of Pollard and 
Ames, the executive and legislative branches of the United States government have 
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sought to implement proactive approaches to deter, detect, and respond to the threat of 
espionage.  Their proposal to achieve these objectives is called Counterintelligence 21 
or CI21.  The initiative “would create a national counterintelligence executive with 
independent resources and staff to act as a focal point and conduit between policy 
makers, Congress, and private industry on the one hand, and the intelligence, law 
enforcement, and defense communities on the other” (Kitfield 2862).  The approach 
also called for the appointment of a counterintelligence czar to coordinate increased 
information exchanges between the intelligence, defense, and law enforcement 
establishments.  The motives behind the creation of CI21 are laudable, but it is utterly 
unrealistic to assume that the addition of another bureaucratic dimension will 
miraculously prevent security failures.   
To prevent security failures and compromises of secure information as well as 
those who collect it and analyze it, the intelligence community must simply be more 
cognizant of its own distinct culture.  The intelligence mission, the workforce that 
pursues its objectives, and the resources those employees must employ to support 
national security priorities necessitate and create an organizational culture unlike no 
other.  Intelligence professionals may only reduce security failures by developing and 
implementing cultural artifacts that address the divide between organizational 
assumptions and individual values.  Recent improvements in these areas have proven it 
is possible to balance these elements of the intelligence community’s organizational 
culture, but continued vigilance is necessary if the intelligence community wishes to 
avoid security compromises such as those achieved by Jonathan Jay Pollard, Aldrich 
Hazen Ames, and Robert Philip Hanssen. 
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